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Preface
Discerning the decisionmaking of Kim Jong-Un and the North Korean 
regime on issues of peaceful engagement and warlike actions endures 
as a mighty challenge for U.S. intelligence analysts and policymak-
ers. In this report, we seek to inform analysis of Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (DPRK) leadership decisionmaking. To do so, we 
use three discussion papers that were written to facilitate discussion of 
an interagency working group. The three papers are assembled here in 
a single report. The first discussion paper describes decisionmaking 
among different authoritarian regimes, including North Korea, and 
the opening up of those economies to outside engagement. The second 
paper outlines two different scenarios that might occur when conven-
tional deterrence on the Korean Peninsula breaks down and the result-
ing decisions that North Korea’s leadership could face. The third paper 
assesses DPRK decisionmaking about nuclear weapon use. The report 
concludes with some observations, drawn from the issues covered in 
these three discussion papers, about DPRK decisionmaking and stabil-
ity on the Korean Peninsula.
This research was sponsored by National Intelligence Council 
and conducted within the Cyber and Intelligence Policy Center of the 
RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD), which operates 
the National Defense Research Institute (NDRI), a federally funded 
research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secre-
tary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, 
the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense 
intelligence enterprise. 
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For more information on the RAND Cyber and Intelligence 
Policy Center, see www.rand.org/nsrd/intel or contact the director 
(contact information is provided on the webpage).
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Discerning the decisionmaking of Kim Jong-Un and the North Korean 
regime on issues of peaceful engagement and warlike actions endures 
as a mighty challenge for U.S. intelligence analysts and policymakers. 
The National Intelligence Council requested that the RAND Corpo-
ration prepare a series of background papers to facilitate discussion at 
three Intelligence Community working group meetings on Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) decisionmaking. The first session 
focused on the experiences of authoritarian countries and how they 
navigated toward opening their economies and political systems—
more the former than the latter. The second session focused on how 
conventional deterrence might fail on the Korean Peninsula and how 
conflict might escalate. The third and final session focused on how 
nuclear deterrence might break down and nuclear use might ensue.
Insights from Three Discussion Papers
Prospects That North Korea Will Engage in Market Reform
To understand why Kim Jong-Un might decide to adopt a new eco-
nomic model (and some of the challenges that might result from such a 
decision), we analyzed the economic opening decisions and experiences 
of North Korea and three other communist regimes—China, Viet-
nam, and Cuba—and examined the factors that shaped North Korea’s 
own past reform initiatives.
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We concluded that, although no single factor emerges as the sole 
predictor of a communist regime’s decision to open up, several common 
considerations do appear across the cases studied (Table S.1).
These factors include a rapid deterioration in central government 
finances; a relaxation in the necessity for ideological purity (linked, in 
the cases of Vietnam and Cuba, to China’s desire to pursue economic 
liberalization and to the collapse of the Soviet Union, respectively, 
thus providing Hanoi and Havana with measures of political cover); 
and, most important, the removal from office or death of key leaders 
who had opposed reform. Other factors also affect reform decisions; 
depending on the case, these can be incipient famine and widespread 
demands for improvement in living conditions that threaten to shake 
the regime’s grip on power, spreading corruption and the erosion of 
control over the state-led sector of the economy, and/or the loss of a 
great-power patron.
U.S. policies in encouraging these regimes to open up or sanc-
tioning them for their foreign policies or domestic abuses (carrots 
or sticks) do not appear to have figured directly in most of these 
instances of communist reform decisionmaking. Most of these gov-
ernments were under some degree of economic pressure from the 
United States and continued to have challenging relationships with 
Table S.1
Factors Shaping Communist Economic Reform Initiative Decisions
Factor China Vietnam Cuba North Korea
Removal of leader opposed to opening X X X
Scarcity of food and consumer goods X X X X
Hyperinflation X
Loss of foreign aid and patronage X X X
Economic sanctions X X X
Expansion of illicit markets X X
Declining central government finances X X X X
Loosening ideology X X X
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Washington, but their decisions to reform do not appear to be a 
direct outgrowth of either U.S. threats to impose harsher sanctions 
or U.S. offers of assistance if the regimes move toward economic lib-
eralization. This suggests that the effects of such incentives are likely 
to be felt somewhat indirectly and to work only if the Kim regime 
perceives that it is facing a situation in which U.S.-led sanctions are 
putting the regime’s survival at risk.
Conventional Deterrence on the Korean Peninsula: Two Scenarios 
for Analysis
What factors affect DPRK thinking and decisionmaking about con-
ventional deterrence and escalation on the Korean Peninsula? We 
explored this question by selecting and then examining two “what 
if” scenarios in the year 2022 that depict situations in which con-
ventional deterrence erodes and fails. The scenarios were designed 
to explore the critical factors that could affect the thinking of the 
DPRK regime during an evolving crisis and what might lead the 
regime to attack Republic of Korea (ROK) and U.S. forces stationed 
on the Peninsula.
The two scenarios posit that a perception of weakened U.S.-ROK 
deterrence—real or misperceived—by North Korea will lead to erosion 
of conventional deterrence. Each scenario ends with North Korea carry-
ing out military action, but neither considers the next steps that might 
occur. The purpose of ending the scenarios in this way was to generate 
discussion about what happens when a crisis occurs in which conven-
tional military power is used, conventional deterrence erodes, and escala-
tion to the potential use of nuclear weapons becomes a possibility.
An important insight from these two scenarios is that conven-
tional deterrence (which has been effective since 1953) could quickly 
erode during a crisis, depending on other factors that influence the 
integrity of deterrence on the Korean Peninsula. Assessing some plau-
sible scenarios in which conventional deterrence is stressed on the 
Peninsula shows how a stable alignment can be upset by conventional 
conflict in response to a crisis and quickly escalate to a nuclear crisis. 
Once fighting with conventional weapons begins, there might be few 
off-ramps for avoiding a nuclear exchange. Thus, understanding how 
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conventional deterrence works—and how it might fail—is important 
to understanding nuclear deterrence.
North Korea Nuclear Doctrine
This case study evaluates questions about North Korea’s approach to 
nuclear weapons, such as how North Korea think about (1) its nuclear 
doctrine, desired force posture, and related capabilities needs; (2) the 
relationship between its nuclear and conventional forces; and (3) the 
role of nuclear weapons in deterrence and escalation. It also evaluates 
the conditions under which North Korea might consider nuclear use.
This case study evaluates these key questions by examining open-
source data on possible DPRK nuclear doctrines and comparing them 
with scenarios that might call for the use of nuclear weapons. The 
result is necessarily somewhat speculative, both because our knowledge 
of North Korea’s nuclear doctrine is extremely limited and because the 
actual response of national leaders in any given contingency cannot be 
predicted. 
The evaluation identified five potential doctrines—minimum 
deterrence, catalytic, massive preemption, assured retaliation, and 
asymmetric escalation—and assessed the possible utility of different 
nuclear doctrines to North Korea in terms of three specific regime 
objectives for its nuclear force (not necessarily in priority order):
1. bolstering regime strength through prestige, legitimacy, coer-
cive power, and nationalist credibility
2. deterring U.S. coercion or attack
3. in extreme circumstances, supporting offensive operations 
through escalation dominance, empowering provocation, or 
offensive warfare.
Evolving DPRK nuclear doctrine and capabilities point to 
potential cases in which North Korea might use nuclear weapons. 
The interplay among doctrine, capabilities, and weapons use is out-
lined in Table S.2.
An important insight revealed in this roster of nuclear use scenar-
ios is that the United States and South Korea have a significant ability 
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to control the circumstances that would lead North Korea to undertake 
nuclear use. The first three scenarios would all stem from a DPRK per-
ception of regime threat and (in some cases) would require the initia-
tion of conflict. The fourth scenario can be forestalled with continuing 
alliance commitments and coordination with other key actors, such as 
China. Through a combination of restraint, political agreements to 
reduce mutual threat perceptions and the perceived risk of war, and 
continued credible deterrent threats, the United States should be able 
have significant confidence in its ability to mitigate the scenarios for 
DPRK nuclear use.
Table S.2
Scenarios for DPRK Nuclear Use
Scenario Forcing Conditions Form of Nuclear Use





forces operating inside 
North Korea or on verge 
of doing so; no fatal 
threat to regime yet
Single nuclear warhead 
or small number of 
them used against lead 
elements of advancing 
U.S.-ROK forces
2: Large-scale strike 
against U.S. force flow 
and military targets
Conflict might be 
underway or not yet 
begun; North Korea 
perceives that United 
States is beginning process 
of large-scale attack to 
end regime
Dozens of nuclear 
weapons (the entire DPRK 
force minus perhaps a 
handful of strategic-
deterrent warheads) 
used against U.S. military 
facilities and forces; 
possibly other targets, 
such as ROK and Japanese 
facilities
3: Ultimate deterrent 
strike against U.S. targets
In endgame, North 
Korea employs whatever 
weapons can reach the 
territorial United States 
to punish or paralyze U.S. 
military action
Small number of ICBM or 
SLBM weapons targeted 
against territorial United 
States
4: Nuclear coercive threats 
and potential first strike 
against South Korea to 
compel surrender
U.S.-ROK alliance has 
fractured, China unwilling 
to prevent outcome, 
North Korea sees chance 
to realize its ultimate goal
Unclear; if coercive threat 
was rejected, could 
involve a graduated 
campaign of nuclear use
NOTE: ICBM = intercontinental ballistic missile; SLBM = submarine-launched ballistic 
missile.
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Conclusions
In April 2019, North Korea set an end-of-year deadline to move U.S.-
DPRK negotiations forward; in a New Year’s speech that December, 
Kim Jong-Un argued that it was up to the United States to make 
accommodations or his country would end its self-imposed restraint 
on nuclear and missile testing. He indicated that the world would see a 
new strategic weapon in the country’s arsenal. U.S. officials and North 
Korea watchers wondered whether North Korea would conduct a 
nuclear test or test another ballistic missile that could reach the United 
States. In the end Kim did not test a weapon system, but he did state 
that (1) his country would go a new way and not abandon its nuclear 
weapons capabilities while waiting for the United States to (in Kim’s 
view) negotiate constructively and (2) he would work with other coun-
tries to achieve his country’s safety and prosperity.
Kim Jong-Un’s New Year’s message did not shock the world with 
any new threatening revelation.1 Rather, he indicated that the struggle 
to protect North Korea as a sovereign state would continue unabated 
and that the way ahead would be difficult. The country will continue 
to modernize its defense capabilities and pursue economic advance-
ment at the same time. Through international diplomacy in 2019 
with several major powers—most importantly the United States and 
China but also Russia—Kim sought to demonstrate that North Korea 
is a sovereign state with relations that protect it by virtue of its multi-
national connections.
Although the Kim regime labors under international sanctions, it 
receives enough resources and funding from sanctions evasion activi-
ties that it can pursue limited showcase economic projects in tourist 
resorts and add to its military capabilities at the same time. The show-
case projects in special economic zones can help keep the elite cadre 
economically satisfied. Similarly, having already achieved a credible 
conventional and nuclear deterrent posture, North Korea can continue 
1 Report of the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the WPK (Kim 
Jong Un’s 2020 New Year Address), as published and translated into English by the Korean 
Central News Agency, National Committee of North Korea, January 1, 2020.
Summary    xv
its weapon modernization plans at a level that does not spark additional 
international pressure.
Thus, the stability on the Korean Peninsula can withstand peri-
odic shocks. Unless there is a bolt out of the blue, there is little danger 
of stability eroding quickly. Kim Jong-Un and the North Korean lead-
ership perceive DPRK nuclear weapons capability as essential to safe-
guarding the regime’s survival. Only a threat to the regime’s survival 
would lead it to the existential decision of using a nuclear weapon 
and risk a massive retaliatory strike. North Korean leaders perceive 
their nuclear capability as the ultimate guarantee of their survival. If 
accidents that trigger war can be avoided, North Korea, South Korea, 
and the United States have options for limiting the risk of putting the 
North Korean leadership in a position where it believes it faces an exis-
tential choice that lacks clear or desirable endpoints. Monitoring the 
evolution of the North Korean leadership decision options will be a 
critical task for the U.S. Intelligence Community to provide U.S. poli-
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On February 27 and 28, 2019, the North Korea–United States Hanoi 
Summit (commonly known as the Hanoi Summit) took place in Viet-
nam; it followed the Singapore Summit in June 2018 between the lead-
ers from the United States and North Korea. The Hanoi Summit was 
truncated and no agreement was reached. President Donald Trump’s 
administration argued that the summit was abruptly ended when 
North Korea demanded an end to all sanctions against it; the North 
Koreans argued that they were only asking for a partial lifting of the 
five United Nations sanctions imposed on the country between 2016 
and 2017.
With talks between the United States and North Korea at a 
standstill, U.S. policymakers must consider what the Democratic Peo-
ple’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) regime might do moving forward and 
know what signs or decisions to look for. At the request of the National 
Intelligence Council, we prepared a series of background papers (draw-
ing on previous work and reviewing relevant literature) to help facili-
tate discussion for three Council working group sessions.
The first session focused on the experience of authoritarian coun-
tries and how they navigated toward opening their economies and 
political systems—more the former than the latter. The second ses-
sion focused on how conventional deterrence might fail on the Korean 
Peninsula and how conflict might escalate. The third and final session 
focused on how nuclear deterrence might break down and nuclear use 
might ensue.
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The paper we created for the first session (Chapter Two) addressed 
whether North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un would or could pursue a 
China or Vietnam model of economic liberalization, which is some-
thing the Trump administration has hoped for. The second paper 
(Chapter Three) covered the stability of conventional deterrence on 
the Korean Peninsula, how mistakes might occur, and the severity of 
consequences for miscommunication. The third paper (Chapter Four) 
focused on nuclear deterrence; although such deterrence seems stable 
now, it could change as the DPRK arsenal grows. That said, the United 
States has considerable influence on how to maintain the nuclear deter-
rent relationship. This report concludes with some observations, drawn 
from the issues covered in these three discussion papers, about DPRK 
decisionmaking and stability on the Korean Peninsula.
3CHAPTER TWO
Prospects That North Korea Will Engage in 
Market Reform
Will Kim open up the DPRK economy? The United States and South 
Korea have sought to encourage Pyongyang to make a strategic deci-
sion to abandon its nuclear weapon and ballistic missile programs, 
adopt a new relationship with the international community, and chart 
a path to economic development premised on markets, trade, and for-
eign direct investment (FDI) in North Korea. Kim has indicated that 
the policy priorities of his administration are now shifting toward eco-
nomic development, and he joined the Singapore Summit statement 
pledging “firm and unwavering commitment to complete denuclear-
ization of the Korean Peninsula.”1 North Korea has often hinted at 
both these goals in the past without actually following through. If 
North Korea were to pursue a strategic decision to reform its economic 
model and open up to the outside world, what factors would likely lead 
it to do so and what indicators would there be that the regime was seri-
ous this time?
To shed light on these questions, we reviewed the opening and 
reform decisions of North Korea and three other communist regimes—
China, Vietnam, and Cuba—and the history of North Korea’s own 
economic initiatives. We looked for commonalities and differences 
across the cases to determine what factors appear to correlate with a 
regime deciding to open up to the outside world. In the cases studies 
on China, Vietnam, and Cuba, we sought to highlight the internal 
debates in those countries over whether, why, and how to reform and 
1  Donald J. Trump and Kim Jong-Un, joint statement, Singapore Summit, June 12, 2018.
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the factors that spurred decisionmakers to move in a particular direc-
tion. Our research drew on open, secondary source literature, some pri-
mary source Communist Party or government documents, and some 
interviews. This analysis is intended to help provide a framework for 
thinking through the relationship between political decisionmaking 
and economic reform.
In this chapter, we start by looking at the key factors that we 
determined affected the decisionmaking of the countries examined. 
We then examine the reform decisions of China, Vietnam, Cuba, and 
North Korea from approximately the 1980s through the present. 
First, we lay out the experience of Deng Xiaoping in reforming 
China after the death of Mao Zedong, from 1978 to roughly 1992. We 
highlight key differences between the China and North Korea cases, 
such as the much more collective Chinese approach to decisionmaking, 
the declining role of ideology, and the greater confidence of Chinese 
leaders that their regime could survive opening up. 
Second, we examine the case of the Vietnamese Communist 
Party (VCP) leadership following the death of Party General Secretary 
Le Duan and the VCP’s 1986 decision to pursue doi moi (“renovation” 
or economic reform) to stave off inflation, famine, and possible eco-
nomic and state collapse. 
Third, we then shift away from Asian communist regimes to 
describe the experiences of the regimes of Fidel Castro and Raúl Castro 
Ruz in Cuba, which might be the case that is most comparable to 
North Korea today. Like North Korea but unlike China and Vietnam, 
Cuba was a dynastic communist regime for more than 50 years, with 
founding leader Fidel Castro and his brother Raúl refusing to relax the 
ideological strictures on the economy, even given massive hunger for 
goods and food among the Cuban people and the loss of a superpower 
patron in the Soviet Union. Most Cuban economic reforms have been 
piecemeal and, to date, have resulted in a far less open economic system 
than those of China or Vietnam (which themselves remain far from 
truly market-based); instead, the regime has been willing to reform 
only reluctantly, and when confronted with a choice between survival 
or ideological purity.
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Fourth, we explore North Korea’s similar experience of losing 
great-power patronage, the regime’s shift to extorting aid and assis-
tance from the international community and its immediate neighbors 
(and through illicit activities), and the extent to which it has sought to 
reimpose control over the economic life of the country whenever it has 
had the breathing room to try to do so.
Finally, we offer some concluding thoughts on the takeaway les-
sons from these cases for the analysis of North Korea’s likeliest next 
steps and decisionmaking process.
Factors That Influence Economic Reform Decisionmaking
We compiled a series of eight factors that we hypothesized might 
shape leadership decisionmaking of communist regimes on economic 
reforms:
• removal of leader opposed to opening up the country
• scarcity of food and consumer goods in the country
• existence of hyperinflation
• loss of foreign aid and patronage
• economic sanctions imposed on the country
• expansion of illicit markets in the country
• decline of central government finances
• loosening of the country’s overarching ideology.
We then sought to test the validity of our hypothesis with a set of 
case studies. Not all factors applied equally to the case studies, but all 
were present to some degree.
Factors That Influenced China’s Economic Reform 
Decisions
China’s economic reform is the archetype of a country transitioning from 
a Soviet-style planned economy to a market-based one. The decades fol-
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lowing the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee 
in 1978 saw an unprecedented period of economic growth, resulting in 
the country’s transformation into a global economic powerhouse. Many 
analysts, including many Chinese observers, suggest that North Korea 
could take steps toward economic liberalization that would enable it to 
follow a similar path. Thus, China’s experiences could serve as a blue-
print for DPRK economic reform. Here, we chart the course of the Chi-
nese transition and highlight the motivations, goals, pitfalls, and zigzags 
in China’s economic reform and opening up. The first section lays a 
foundation for the following sections by describing China’s situation on 
the eve of economic reform in 1978. The second section provides an 
overview of the key debates and issues that emerged in China’s economic 
reforms. The final section compares and contrasts China at the onset of 
the economic reforms with North Korea today.
Politics and Economic Policy in the Pre-Reform Period
On the eve of reform, China was governed by a fragmented leadership 
still recovering from the political turmoil of the Cultural Revolution. 
To some, Mao’s death in September 1976 and the downfall of the Gang 
of Four a month later signaled the end of the revolutionary excesses of 
the previous decade, during which Maoists purged vast numbers of the 
Communist Party elite. Chief among those was Deng, who would later 
play a central role in reform. On returning to power, Deng’s faction 
sought to challenge the weak authority of Hua Guofeng, Mao’s hand-
picked successor, who sought to wrap himself in the mantle of Mao’s 
authority and legacy by promulgating a policy of “two whatevers.”2 
Hua’s efforts to sideline Deng proved ineffective. Although Hua held 
powerful official titles, Deng had the backing of a strong political base 
consisting of senior party officials and veteran bureaucrats, the People’s 
2  Joseph Fewsmith, Dilemmas of Reform in China: Political Conflict and Economic Debate, 
Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1994, p. 20. The “two whatevers” refers to the statement that 
“we will resolutely uphold whatever policy decisions Chairman Mao made, and unswerv-
ingly follow whatever instructions Chairman Mao gave” that first appeared in a February 
1977 editorial. See Yan Sun, The Chinese Reassessment of Socialism, 1976–1992, Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995, pp. 23–24.
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Liberation Army, and the intelligentsia (many of whom suffered greatly 
under the Maoists).3
On the economic side, the death of Mao and the subsequent end 
of the Cultural Revolution allowed China’s leaders the opportunity to 
address chronic issues that had emerged during that revolution, such 
as stagnant growth of agriculture and living conditions and inefficien-
cies in the industrial sector. The government under Hua attempted to 
rehabilitate the command economic system by rebuilding the adminis-
trative institutions that had atrophied during the Cultural Revolution 
while simultaneously planning for a dramatic acceleration of economic 
growth.4 A grandiose program of development laid out in the Ten-Year 
Plan of Economic Development 1976–1985 emphasized investments in 
heavy industry, particularly the import of complete plants from indus-
trialized nations.5 In the countryside, Hua touted the Dazhai model of 
collectivized agriculture and promoted the rapid mechanization of the 
rural sector.6 Economic policy prior to the reform period attempted to 
replicate the massive industrialization and collectivization of agricul-
ture inspired by the Soviet Union and implemented by China prior to 
the Cultural Revolution.
The ambitious goals laid out in the Ten-Year Plan quickly proved 
impossible to achieve. Faulty planning overestimated the capabilities of 
the economy, resulting in an unsustainable commitment of resources 
3  Maurice Meisner, The Deng Xiaoping Era: An Inquiry into the Fate of Chinese Socialism, 
1978–1994, New York: Hill and Wang, 1996, pp. 88–89. Deng’s case for leadership was 
helped by a disastrous oil rig explosion in the Bohai Gulf and the roughly simultaneous drop 
in production at the Daqing oil field, both of which further damaged the political standing 
of Hua and his supporters. The poor performance of the People’s Liberation Army in Viet-
nam also enabled Deng to sideline military leaders who were aligned with Hua. 
4  Barry Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform 1978–1993, New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. pp. 64–65.
5  Naughton, 1996, pp. 68–69.
6  The Dazhai model, named for the poor and barren region of Shanxi Province in which 
it came into being, took “the production brigade as the basic unit of account, [abolished] the 
cultivation of private plots, and [emphasized] ideological rather than material incentives” 
(Fewsmith, 1994, p. 20).
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to an unrealistic wish list of projects.7 Meanwhile, calls for the rapid 
mechanization of the rural sector failed to account for the inability 
of impoverished rural communes to purchase agricultural machinery, 
leaving in place the bottleneck of stagnant agricultural production.8 
The final nail in the coffin was the collapse of China’s petroleum pro-
duction in the late 1970s. China’s economic planners had envisioned 
using hard currency earned from petroleum exports to fund foreign 
technology imports.9 The complete failure to locate new oil-producing 
fields in 1978 after years of promising returns, coupled with the peaking 
of output in existing fields, dashed those designs,10 and China’s leaders 
realized the country’s development required a different approach.
With economic performance lagging, Hua’s political position 
became increasingly precarious. To counter Hua’s “two whatevers,” 
Deng and his allies extolled the principles of “seeking truth from 
facts” and making “practice the sole criterion of truth.”11 The “prac-
tice faction,” as they came to be known, sought to repudiate the ultra-
leftists’ radical policies and ideology and quickly garnered the support 
of veteran party officials purged during the Cultural Revolution. At 
the Third Plenum in December 1978, several Deng allies, notably 
the veteran economic planner Chen Yun and Deng’s protégé Hu Yao-
bang, were elevated to high-level positions in the Party hierarchy, thus 
assuring Deng’s ascendance.12 Over the next two years, the remaining 
“whateverists” gradually fell from power, opening the door to the eco-
nomic reform of the next decade.
China’s Experience with Opening up and Reform
China’s debates over economic policy saw officials fall into the two 
broad camps of reformers and conservatives. Deng—along with his 
7  Naughton, 1996, pp. 70–71. 
8  Fewsmith, 1994, p. 20. 
9  Naughton,1996, p. 71.
10  Naughton, 1996, pp. 71–74.
11  Sun, 1995, pp. 24–31.
12  Meisner, 1996, p. 98.
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proteges Hu (Party General Secretary) and Zhao (Premier)—formed 
the core of the former; Chen (Chair of the Central Advisory Commis-
sion)—along with fellow conservatives Li Xiannian (President), Yao 
Yilin (Vice-Premier), and, after 1987, Li Peng (Premier)—formed the 
core of the latter grouping. Generally speaking, the reformers favored 
faster economic growth and deeper integration into the world econ-
omy; they were comfortable with more-extensive use of market signals 
and material incentives; and they were willing to tolerate higher trade 
imbalances and levels of inflation than conservatives saw as accept-
able. Conservatives prioritized steady, measured growth; they empha-
sized the necessity of central control over the economy and the leading 
roles of the state and the plan; and they viewed integration into the 
world economy with trepidation. The dividing line between the groups 
was not always clear. For example, the degree of support that Deng 
extended to market reforms and opening up generally depended on 
two factors: the extent to which reforms incurred political opposition 
from conservatives, and the extent to which economic reforms could be 
carried out without also undertaking political reforms.
The remaking of the Chinese economy during the first decade 
of the reforms can be divided into two broad waves. The period from 
1979 to the end of 1980 marked the first wave, which saw the begin-
nings of agricultural liberalization and enterprise reform. Backlash over 
perceived departures from ideology and concerns over an overheating 
economy saw the conservatives assert control over economic policy in 
December 1980. As positive developments in the economy undercut 
conservative concerns, the second phase of reform began in 1984 and 
ended in 1988, when rapid inflation attendant on price decontrols 
led to protests that hardliners (such as Li and Yao) used to persuade 
Deng to shift control of managing the economy away from Zhao. The 
Tiananmen Square tragedy and Zhao’s ensuing ouster saw conserva-
tives dominate economic decisionmaking until 1992, when the failure 
of hardline economic policies led Deng to reassert the need for reforms 
leading to greater use of market signals and spurring the economic 
takeoff that has largely persisted to the present day.
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Developments in Rural Reform
Economic reform saw early success in the rural sector, where collectiv-
ized farming gradually gave way to the liberalization of agriculture. 
In 1978, peasants in Anhui Province—with the tacit support of local 
cadres—adopted a “household responsibility system” that shifted pro-
duction responsibility from the collective to the household, permitting 
families to retain (and even sell) any over-quota agricultural output, 
thereby incentivizing farmers to work hard and capture the gains of 
their labor.13 Although successful, the experiments drew strong con-
demnation from those opposed to changes in the socialist system of 
ownership; such opposition resulted in these experiments being con-
fined initially to poor and mountainous regions.14 Opposition was par-
ticularly strong in wealthy coastal provinces that had a relatively suc-
cessful track record of developing collective economies.15 However, by 
1982, the household responsibility system had spread to more than 
72 percent of production teams in China.16
Several factors contributed to widespread proliferation of the 
system. First, the resulting high yields in agricultural productivity 
undercut efforts by conservatives to roll back the household responsi-
bility system.17 Second, the household responsibility system possessed 
strong political backing, first by provincial officials (such as Wan) and 
later on by national leaders (such as Deng); this backing was informed 
by data gathered by local party officials and extrabureaucratic orga-
nizations (such as the Rural Development Research Group).18 Third, 
13  Peasants contracted land, other resources, and output quotas to individual households. 
See Fewsmith, 1994, pp. 27–28; also see Kate Xiao Zhou, How the Farmers Changed China: 
Power of the People, New York: WestView Press, 1996.
14  Fewsmith, 1994, pp. 30–31. Areas where the household responsibility system first took 
off, or spread fastest, were often those that had suffered most during the famine and were at 
risk of renewed food shortage. Political leaders from these regions included future Premier 
and later Party General Secretary Zhao and future Vice-Premier Wan Li. 
15  Fewsmith, 1994, p. 44.
16  Fewsmith, 1994, p. 48.
17  Fewsmith, 1994, pp. 48–49.
18  Fewsmith, 1994, pp 48–49. 
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the countryside proved too vast for the central bureaucracy to exert 
control over, thus giving local officials more breathing room to pursue 
reform.19
Although the early returns of rural reforms were a resounding 
success, peasants eventually encountered bureaucratic barriers. These 
included difficulty selling crops and inability to move goods from one 
area to the other.20 Reforms implemented in 1983 attempted to address 
these issues by permitting the further loosening of the agricultural 
sector and the tacit acceptance of hired labor.21 The latter was a con-
tentious issue; conservatives equated hired labor with the restoration 
of capitalism in the countryside.22 However, the continued growth in 
rural incomes and living standards provided political capital to Deng 
and other economic liberalizers, thus enabling the reforms to proceed.
Not all reforms in the agricultural sector met with success. 
Under political pressure in 1985 to address overproduction, the heavy 
burden of grain subsidies, and the need to direct funds into com-
prehensive urban reform, then-Premier Zhao attempted to abolish 
the state’s monopoly on grain procurement and sales and replace it 
with a contract-based system.23 However, the policy failed to address 
disparities between the set prices of the contracts with the state and 
the fluctuating prices of grain on the market, thus disincentivizing 
peasant willingness to engage in the contracts.24 The result was a 
precarious decline in grain production that elicited conservative criti-
cism and halted major agricultural reforms for the duration of Zhao’s 
remaining years in power.
19  Fewsmith, 1994, pp 48–49.
20  Fewsmith, 1994, p. 124.
21  Fewsmith, 1994, p. 124 
22  Fewsmith, 1994, p. 124. 
23  Under this system, peasants entered into voluntary contracts with the state to sell an 
agreed on amount of grain for a set price, allowing peasants to sell the surplus on the free 
market. Fewsmith, 1994, p. 154.
24  Fewsmith, 1994, p. 156. 
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Developments in Enterprise Reform
Enterprise reform proceeded at a much slower pace than agricultural 
reform. This was because of the outsized role of the state in industry, 
the greater connections between industry and national power, and the 
regime’s perceptions that its own survival prospects were tied to its con-
trol over urban areas because of their importance to the country’s polit-
ical life. Control over urban areas was viewed as much more important 
than control of the rural portions of the country. The relative laxity 
of state control in the countryside allowed reforms to emerge locally 
with the tacit acceptance of party officials; industry was wholly inte-
grated into the state apparatus, with vested bureaucratic interests that 
blunted the pace of reform.25 Reforms in the enterprise sector therefore 
proceeded in what Naughton describes as a classic fang-shou (放–受) 
policy cycle, with periods of energetic reforms (or “letting go” [fang]) 
followed by retrenchment (or “recovery” of state control [shou]).26
The economic policymakers who led enterprise reform did not 
endorse wholesale economic transformation. Rather, they advocated 
reforms to the status quo through the piecemeal introduction of 
market concepts into the plan. Economists in the late 1970s attempted 
to rehabilitate “objective economic laws,” such as the law of value, to 
provide a Marxian rationale for economic reform.27 Although a minor-
ity of economists supported radical market reforms, the main line of 
economic thinking sought an “organic integration” of plan and market 
that would see market forces play a role in achieving a socialist end.28
Early experiments in enterprise reform sought to adjust the rela-
tionship between enterprises and the state. According to proponents of 
this line of thinking, administrative constraints imposed by the state 
prevented enterprises from operating at their productive potential. This 
view was opposed by two camps in the 1970s—those who desired a 
stronger role for the state and those who sought to relegate administra-
25  Fewsmith, 1994, p. 56.
26  Naughton, 1996, p. 98.
27  Meisner, 1996, p. 211.
28  See Fewsmith, 1994, pp. 66–70; and Meisner, 1996, p. 213.
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tive authority to the provinces.29 In late 1978, Sichuan Province began 
trial experiments with expanded enterprise autonomy, the success of 
which led to the implementation of experimental enterprise autonomy 
nationwide in 1979.30 Along with granting enterprise managers greater 
decisionmaking powers over production and marketing, reforms also 
included profit retention to incentivize productivity and the creation of 
five special economic zones (SEZs) (经济特区).31
Although the aforementioned measures introduced a modicum of 
efficiency and productivity in enterprises, substantial issues remained. 
Some degree of flexibility emerged at the basic level, but enterprises 
remained hindered by their links to the wider economic bureaucra-
cy.32 Furthermore, these reforms were carried out in an environment 
in which the price structure remained irrational: Little FDI existed; 
private property and intellectual property were largely unprotected 
by any meaningful legal structures; technological sophistication was 
low; quality control was virtually nonexistent; and provincial author-
ities routinely discriminated against or even banned goods made in 
other provinces.33 The resulting economic problems gave conservatives 
ammunition to criticize a reform program that they perceived as too 
radical a departure from their economic and ideological beliefs. By late 
1980, the reform program ground to a halt.
The period between 1980 and 1982 saw a retrenchment of reform, 
with conservatives led by Chen imposing tighter economic and ideo-
logical controls. Their apprehension toward earlier reforms belied a 
belief in the primacy of a planned economy in which market forces 
merely played a supplementary role.34 Proper planning, conservatives 
argued, must be maintained to prevent macroeconomic imbalances 
29  Fewsmith, 1994, p. 73.
30  Naughton, 1996, pp. 99–100.
31  Naughton, 1996, p. 101.
32  Naughton, 1996, p. 119.
33  Fewsmith, 1994, p. 115.
34  For an expanded discussion of the views of Chen Yun and his followers, see Fewsmith, 
1994, pp. 88–89.
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and economic disorder. By the end of 1982, however, conservative pre-
dictions of economic difficulty and slow growth were swept aside by 
positive developments in the economic situation.35 With their warnings 
undermined, the reform agenda returned to the forefront of Chinese 
economic policy.
The second wave of industrial reform (between 1984 and 1988) 
began under a set of circumstances different from the first. Improved 
economic conditions, the experiences of the first reform period, and 
Deng’s enhanced authority all contributed to a reform program that 
was stronger and wider in scope. Furthermore, this period saw noted 
reformer Zhao emerge as a central figure in the reform process, having 
carved out enough political leverage to emerge from Chen’s shadow as 
the primary driver of economic policy.36
The reform program introduced in 1984 contained elements of ear-
lier reforms. Enterprise autonomy was expanded with such reforms as 
a factory manager responsibility system, long-term profit contracting, 
the linking of wages to profit, and output autonomy.37 These reforms 
sought to improve incentives for enterprises to operate in a market. A 
second emerging development was the initiation of a dual-track system 
that greatly expanded the role of market forces in which a planned econ-
omy and a growing market economy coexisted. The system emerged as 
a compromise with conservatives who insisted on partitioning the econ-
omy into plan and market sectors.38 However, by fixing the absolute size 
of the plan, reformists were able to marginalize the importance of the 
planned economy as the market economy expanded.39
Debates over economic policy in the late 1980s primarily centered 
on the rapid rate of growth and associated issues, such as inflation 
and continuing trade imbalances. Conservatives expressed alarm at 
imbalances caused by high growth rates and argued for the imposition 
35  Fewsmith, 1994, pp. 128–129. 
36  Naughton, 1996, p. 178.
37  Naughton, 1996, p. 205.
38  Naughton, 1996, p. 182. 
39  Naughton, 1996, p. 220. 
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of greater central controls.40 Reformists fell into two camps: The first 
was characterized by economists such as Wu Jinglian, who supported 
a tight monetary policy and radical price reform;41 the latter, as repre-
sented by economists of the Economic Reform Institute, emphasized 
microeconomic changes, particularly ownership reform.42 
Deng’s demand that Zhao press ahead with price decontrols at 
the end of 1987 and Zhao’s failure to rein in the consequent inflation 
from such decontrols in 1988 resulted in the return of conservatives to 
the forefront of economic policymaking and helped spur the student 
and broader public protests that exploded in April–June 1989. The 
aftermath of the regime’s decision to crush these protests at Tiananmen 
Square in 1989 solidified the positions of such hardliners as Li and 
Yao, who worked together to institute a conservative economic pro-
gram centered on macroeconomic austerity, recentralization, and pref-
erential treatment for state-owned industries.43 However, the conserva-
tives’ dominance was short-lived as efforts to cool down the economy 
and reduce inflation pushed the economy into a recession and opened 
the door for Deng’s final push to transform China into a more market-
driven economy from 1992 onward.
Similarities and Differences Between China Then and North Korea 
Now
China in the 1970s and North Korea today are nominally Marxist-
Leninist states under one-party rule, but there is a stark contrast in 
the exercise of power. Kim appears to have consolidated his position 
as the absolute ruler of North Korea, especially in aftermath of several 
high-profile purges.44 By contrast, although Deng held immense politi-
cal power following the 1978 Third Plenum, his standing was that of 
40  Fewsmith, 1994, pp. 150–151.
41  Fewsmith, 1994, p. 198.
42  Fewsmith, 1994, p. 198. 
43  Naughton, 1996, p. 274.
44  A notable example is the purge of his powerful uncle, Jang Song-Thaek, in 2013. See 
Alexandre Mansourov, “North Korea: The Dramatic Fall of Jang Song Thaek,” 38 North, 
December 9, 2013. 
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a first among equals, as evidenced by his rivalry with Chen, who led 
the conservative opposition to market reforms throughout the 1980s.45 
This difference, perhaps more than any other in this analysis, stands 
out as important: Deng could be criticized indirectly (and his key lieu-
tenants attacked directly); Kim does not appear to be subject to similar 
constraints on his authority.
Domestically, both China and North Korea have suffered ter-
rible famines. But in the case of China, the death of the regime’s key 
founder (Mao) opened the way for some successors who did not tie 
themselves to his legacy, with Deng leading an effort to reach a verdict 
on Mao that found him to have been 70 percent correct and 30 percent 
in error. This, again, differs substantially from North Korea’s situation: 
Kim’s authority stems from his status as the inheritor of the “bloodline 
of Mangyongdae,” with his grandfather Kim Il-Sung and his father 
Kim Jong-Il given the titles of “eternal leaders of Juche Korea” in the 
revised 2016 Constitution.
On the international stage, the situation that China faced in the 
late 1970s differs somewhat from the one that North Korea faces today. 
By 1978, China and the United States were well on their way to nor-
malization of ties; Beijing had claimed a permanent seat on the United 
Nations Security Council, and the rival regime in Taipei looked increas-
ingly isolated. Relations with the Soviet Union, although not as tense as 
they had been at the high point of Sino-Soviet conflict in the late 1960s, 
were still fraught, given Moscow’s invasion of Afghanistan, its stationing 
of large numbers of armored divisions on the border between the two 
nations, and its support for the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia; all of 
these factors served to drive Beijing and Washington closer.46 
North Korea faces no external threat driving it toward the United 
States; rather, Pyongyang sees an existential threat in the United States 
and its allies. Additionally, China’s size and sense of confidence from 
having fought the United States in Korea in the 1950s and in Viet-
45  Fewsmith, 1994, p. 8.
46  For a discussion of Sino-Soviet threat perceptions in the late 1970s, see Jonathan D. 
Pollack, The Sino-Soviet Rivalry and Chinese Security Debate, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND 
Corporation, R-2907-AF, 1982, pp. 37–38.
Prospects That North Korea Will Engage in Market Reform    17
nam in the 1960s and 1970s differs completely from North Korea’s 
experience of having been defeated and nearly destroyed by the United 
States in 1950 and stymied in its efforts to overturn that defeat in the 
decades since. At the same time, some of North Korea’s military capa-
bilities in 2019 compare favorably with China’s military capabilities 
circa 1978, even though its territory and population size provide it with 
no prospect of trading blows or giving up space for time the way China 
planned to in the event of war with the United States.
In some important ways in the economic sphere, North Korea 
shares similar traits with China at the onset of reform. Both possess(ed) 
factor endowments conducive toward economic growth, such as poor 
use of rural-based human capital and low wages, age structures favor-
able to growth, and proximity to large, advanced markets.47 For the last 
factor in particular, shared cultural links with immediate neighbors 
provide added impetus—China’s experience with advanced econo-
mies, such as Hong Kong and Taiwan, and the potential for coopera-
tion between North Korea and South Korea.48 In terms of economic 
challenges, both countries lack(ed) market mechanisms and institu-
tions, although black markets are probably more advanced in North 
Korea today than they were in China in 1978.49 North Korea’s nascent 
private sector was birthed in the aftermath of the 1994–1998 famine 
and, although technically still illegal, now accounts for as much as 
30 percent to 50 percent of DPRK gross domestic product (GDP).50
47  Naughton, 1994, pp. 51–54.
48  For example, see Naubahar Sharif and Mitchell M. Tseng, “The Role of Hong Kong 
in Mainland China’s Modernization in Manufacturing,” Asian Survey, Vol. 51, No. 4, 
July/August 2011. For a case study of Fujian Province’s experience with Taiwan, see Keun 
Lee, Byung-Yeon Kim, and Insook Lee, “The Possibility of Economic Reform in North 
Korea,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 39, No. 2, May 2009. According to one former 
Republic of Korea (ROK) government official, trade and FDI integration with South Korea 
could boost DPRK annual GDP growth rates by 3 percent. See Jong-Wha Lee and Ju Hyun 
Pyun, “North Korea’s Economic Integration and Growth Potential,” Asian Economic Jour-
nal, Vol. 32, No. 3, September 2018.
49  Although some petty entrepreneurship existed, on the whole, the state maintained a tight 
monopoly on commercial activities. See Naughton, 1996, pp. 45–46.
50  Andrei Lankov, The Resurgence of a Market Economy in North Korea, Moscow: Carnegie 
Moscow Center, 2016, p. 1.
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In terms of foreign trade, both countries experienced low expo-
sure to the wider world. In 1978, China’s total trade accounted for less 
than 1 percent of the world’s total.51 North Korea has similarly low 
levels of foreign trade, the majority of which is conducted with China. 
Since 2014, total trade has declined precipitously for multiple reasons; 
sanctions and the closure of the Kaesong Industrial Complex are two of 
the most important factors.52 The sanctions regime imposed on North 
Korea provides an additional impediment to expanding international 
trade, one that China did not face at the onset of opening and reform. 
Additionally, China’s emergence on the international trade and invest-
ment scene occurred at a time when a country could plausibly employ a 
strategy of moving low-cost, unproductive labor out of the countryside 
and into factories to produce low-quality goods for export; if North 
Korea sought to replicate this pathway today, it would be hampered 
by substantially greater competition from other nations, the growth of 
automation, on-demand 3D printing, and already highly entrenched 
international production chains.
Finally, at the time of China’s opening and reform, no communist 
party had ever fallen from power because of internal collapse (though 
two—Hungary and Czechoslovakia—had been toppled by Soviet inter-
vention intended to head off such a possibility). China’s leaders watched 
the growth of the Solidarity movement in Poland and Charter  77 in 
Czechoslovakia with concern,53 and they saw the Soviet Union’s simulta-
neous pursuit of economic and political restructuring (through Mikhail 
Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost and perestroika) as overly risky, but even 
they did not foresee the ultimate collapse of Eastern European commu-
nism and the dissolution of the Soviet empire. By contrast, the Korean 
Workers Party and the Kim family regime are well aware of the risks of 
51  Information Office of the State Council, China’s Foreign Trade, Beijing, December 2011. 
52  “Total Trade,” North Korea in the World, webpage, undated. 
53 Solidarity was a Polish nongovernmental trade union begun in 1980 by Lech Walesa 
and others that became a broad anti-bureaucratic social movement, using methods of civil 
resistance to advance the causes of workers’ rights and social change. Charter 77 was a civic 
initiative in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic from 1976 to 1992, named after the docu-
ment Charter 77, which criticized the government for failing to implement human rights 
provisions of a number of documents it had signed.
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regime collapse that might result from reforming the economic system 
or, even more so, the political system. As a result, DPRK uses equivalents 
of China’s SEZs to prevent the spread of information, values, and eco-
nomic incentives outside state control, thereby reducing the possibility 
of a wider societal call for openness that might get out of control. North 
Korea under Kim Jong-Un has a lower degree of willingness to run risks 
than China held in the late 1970s. This makes sense: China was striving 
to compete with other great powers and other leading Asian economies; 
in contrast, the DPRK regime’s goals appear substantially more limited 
to survival and, if possible, the reversal of the defeat it suffered in the 
Korean War. This is a key contextual distinction between the Chinese 
and DPRK experiences in this domain.
Factors That Influenced Vietnam’s Economic Reform 
Decisions
What were the drivers of economic reform in Vietnam? Does the path-
way that Vietnam went down in deciding on and carrying out eco-
nomic reform provide any insights that might be useful for assessing 
the motives, possible pitfalls, and trajectory that North Korea might 
follow if it decides to open up its economy? In this section, we explore 
similarities and differences between the two countries before turning 
to a brief examination of Vietnam’s experience and concluding with an 
analysis of what the Vietnam case means for North Korea.
Vietnam and North Korea share some similarities as communist 
nations, notably their shared Marxist-Leninist ideology and aspects of 
the party-state-military political structure, but not much beyond that. 
In North Korea, Kim rules as a living god over a totalitarian regime; 
the VCP runs Vietnam through a collective leadership comprising 
the “four pillar” (tu tru) institutions run by the VCP general secre-
tary (Nguyen Phu Trong), the prime minister (Nguyen Xuan Phuc), 
the president (also Trong), and the chairman of the national assem-
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bly (Nguyen Thi Kim Nagan).54 This fragmented system of author-
ity means that decisions often emerge only after months or even years 
of painstaking negotiation.55 With Kim the primary or sole decision-
maker, he can probably formulate and implement policy decisions very 
quickly; thus, the DPRK leadership can move much more quickly than 
Vietnam’s leadership when it chooses to do so.
The countries also have key differences in their economic sys-
tems. Vietnam loosened strict adherence to a planned economy in 
favor of market Leninism in the late 1980s under its doi moi policy; 
North Korea has mostly resisted external market forces. The VCP’s 
decision to engage in doi moi was primarily the result of socialist state 
institutions failing to improve people’s livelihoods.56 Hanoi began its 
economic reforms while under international economic sanctions for 
its invasion of Cambodia in 1978; it was forced to accelerate these 
efforts by the collapse of its Soviet patrons in 1991.57 Doi moi autho-
rized a return to private initiative in the economy, encouraged foreign 
54  President Tran Dai Quang’s death in September 2018 has caused some consolidation 
of these four separate positions. General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong has since assumed 
the presidency as well. This is exceptionally rare in Vietnamese politics—the most recent 
example preceding this was in 1986, when General Secretary Truong Chinh briefly held 
both positions. Ho Chi Minh, the founder of communist Vietnam, held both titles from 
1951 until his death in 1969. But as a general rule, consolidation of positions is consid-
ered unusual and has prompted some concerned analysis that Truong is poised to become 
the next “strongman” of Vietnam or “Xi Jinping of Vietnam.” See Paul Schuler and Mai 
Truong, “Leadership Reshuffle and the Future of Vietnam’s Collective Leadership,” Perspec-
tive, Vol. 2019, No. 9, ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, February 22, 2019.
55  Party congresses became routinized in 1975. Prior to that, they were held less often and 
less predictably.
56  For example, see Melanie Beresford, National Unification and Economic Development in 
Vietnam, Basingstoke, UK: MacMillan, 1989a; Melanie Beresford, “Vietnam Socialist Agri-
culture in Transition,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 24, No. 4, 1989b, Adam Fforde, 
“Review of Profit and Poverty in Rural Vietnam: Winners and Losers of a Dismantled Revolu-
tion” (by Rita Liljestrom, Eva Lindskog, Nguyen Van Anh, and Vuong Xuan Tinh), Journal 
of Asian Studies, Vol. 58, No. 3, 1999; and Adam Fforde and Stefan deVylder, From Plan to 
Market: The Economic Transition in Vietnam, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996.
57  For an authoritative overview of this history, see Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnam’s Foreign 
Policy in an Era of Rising Sino-U.S. Competition and Increasing Domestic Political Influ-
ence,” Asian Security, Vol. 13, No. 3, July 31, 2017. 
Prospects That North Korea Will Engage in Market Reform    21
trade and direct investment, and stabilized price levels and exchange 
rates.58 These changes, according to the 2019 World Bank overview 
of Vietnam, “have spurred rapid economic growth and development 
and transformed Vietnam from one of the world’s poorest nations to a 
lower middle-income country.”59 Vietnam’s GDP, now approximately 
$241 billion, has increased thirtyfold in the past three decades, and 
its total trade stands at approximately $425  billion.60 Vietnam has 
been called an “Asian tiger” and is now ranked 47th in GDP and 35th 
in purchasing power parity worldwide. These are impressive accom-
plishments, considering that the country in 1988 had approximately 
3 million people suffering from starvation and 5 million malnourished 
within its borders.61
As part of doi moi, Hanoi sought normalization of economic and 
broader overall relations with China, ending years of tension follow-
ing the countries’ 1979 war. The VCP also authorized economic inter-
actions with other countries as a way to reduce Vietnam’s economic 
dependence on China and to otherwise support Vietnamese national 
interests.62 In May 1988, VCP leaders announced Resolution Number 
13, which stressed the need for Vietnam to make “more friends, fewer 
enemies” by forging a multidirectional foreign policy.63 This led to 
58  David Dollar, “The Hanoi Summit Shines a Light on the ‘Vietnam Model’ of Develop-
ment,” Brookings Institution, February 27, 2019. 
59  World Bank, “The World Bank in Vietnam: Overview,” October 15, 2018.
60  For analysis of Vietnam’s economic progress over the past 30 years, see Le Hong Hiep, 
“The Vietnam Model for North Korea,” Project Syndicate, February 26, 2019.
61  Huong Le Thu, “Can Vietnam’s Doi Moi Reforms Be an Inspiration for North Korea?” 
ASAN Forum, August 23, 2018. 
62  Le Hong Hiep, Living Next to the Giant: The Political Economy of Vietnam’s Relations with 
China Under Doi Moi, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS)–Yusof Ishak Institute, 
2017; Le Hong Hiep, “Vietnam’s Domestic-Foreign Policy Nexus: Doi Moi, Foreign Policy 
Reform, and Sino-Vietnamese Normalization,” Asian Politics & Policy, Vol. 5, No. 3, June 25, 
2013. 
63  Resolution Number 13, along with many other VCP resolutions, remain classified within 
Vietnam. In this case, our quotations of Resolution Number 13 were cited in Tung Nguyen 
Vu, “Chapter 8: Vietnam’s Security Challenges: Hanoi’s New Approach to National Security 
and Implications to Defense and Foreign Policies,” in National Institute for Defense Stud-
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an emphasis on pursuing relations with the Association for Southeast 
Asian Nations, Japan, and Europe, and on a “step by step” basis with 
the United States.64
Drivers of Doi Moi
Following North Vietnam’s conquest of South Vietnam in 1975, the 
country was renamed the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV); just 
ten years later, the SRV was on the brink of total socioeconomic col-
lapse, prompting the VCP to radically reconsider the wisdom of main-
taining strict adherence to a planned economy. At the Sixth Party Con-
gress in 1986, the VCP decided to forge ahead with doi moi. VCP 
leaders determined that one-party rule could remain intact while farm-
ers, industrialists, and entrepreneurs were permitted to conduct their 
business with less interference from the state.
At least six main drivers pushed the VCP toward doi moi. We 
explore these here. First, prior to 1986, the VCP had mandated that 
farmers and industrialists rely on the state for their supplies. However, 
the SRV was perpetually behind the curve in delivering supplies in a 
timely and efficient manner.65 People were also regularly affected by 
command economy inefficiencies. Particularly in the run up to doi 
moi, from 1975 to 1985, supplies of consumer goods were woefully 
ies, Asia Pacific Countries’ Security Outlook and its Implications for the Defense Sector, Tokyo, 
NIDS Joint Research Series No. 5, 2010. 
64  See Thayer, 2017; Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnam’s Foreign Policy in an Era of Rising Sino-
U.S. Competition: Providing Equity to the Major Powers While Pursuing Proactive Interna-
tional Integration,” presentation to Conference on Great Power Rivalries, Domestic Politics, 
and Southeast Asian Foreign Policy, The Dorothy Borg Research Project, Weatherhead East 
Asia Institute, Columbia University, November 10–11, 2016; Hiep, 2013; Phan Doan Nam, 
“Ngoai giao Viet Nam sau 20 nam doi moi [Vietnam’s Diplomacy After 20 Years],” Tap Chi 
Cong San [Communist Review], July 14, 2006; Nguyen Manh Hung, “Thuc hien nhat quan 
dong loi doi ngoai doc lap, tu chu, hoa binh, hop tac va phat trien [Consistently Implement-
ing the Foreign Policy of Independence, Autonomy, Peace, and Development],” Tap Chi Cong 
San [Communist Review], September 17, 2006. According to Hiep, many VCP resolutions 
have been referenced or excerpted in Tap Chi Cong San [Communist Review] by Vietnamese 
researchers associated with government-affiliated think tanks; we cite those in this report.
65  Jonathan London, “Viet Nam and the Making of Market-Leninism,” Pacific Review, 
Vol. 22, No. 3, July 2009. 
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inadequate.66 Food scarcity had become a severe problem in the 1970s 
before the supply rebounded by the early 1980s.67 Consumer goods 
were the product of industry, but industrialization could not fully 
occur without first releasing the labor on farms, which meant raising 
the scale of agricultural production through mechanization and tech-
nological improvement.68 Ultimately, Hanoi became locked into the 
worst of both worlds: It was unable to produce desperately needed con-
sumer goods and unable to raise enough food to provide for its people. 
Adding to the misery, a currency crisis, which saw hyperinflation rise 
to 775 percent in 1985, elevated the sense of urgency to fix the econ-
omy.69 Other socioeconomic problems also plagued Vietnam: unem-
ployment (or underemployment), housing shortages, and limited gov-
ernment services in education and health care. To take unemployment 
as an example, the period from 1981 to 1985 witnessed only 15 percent 
of first-time work-eligible Vietnamese able to find employment—out 
of a population of 7 million youths.70 These factors yielded an econ-
omy with 70 percent of the labor force working in agriculture, making 
Vietnam one of the poorest countries in Asia at the time.71
Second, because the state was so inept at providing basic goods 
for production, state-owned enterprise (SOE) employees were incen-
tivized toward black market trading, which led to widespread corrup-
66  If we take production goals in 1980 as an example, food only reached 69 percent of its 
target. Other missed production goals were coal at 52 percent, electricity at 72 percent, sea 
fisheries at 40 percent, cotton fabrics at 39 percent, and paper at 37 percent. For more, see 
Vu Tuan Anh, ed., Vietnam’s Economic Reform: Results and Problems, Hanoi: Social Science 
Publishing House, 1994. 
67  Quan Hoang Vuong, Dam Van Nhue, Daniel van Houtte, and Tri Dung Tran, “The 
Entrepreneurial Facets as Precursor to Vietnam’s Economic Renovation in 1986,” IUP Jour-
nal of Entrepreneurship Development, Vol. VIII, No. 4, 2011. 
68  William J. Duiker, “Ideology and Nation-Building in the Democratic Republic of Viet-
nam,” Asian Survey, Vol. 17, No. 5, 1977. 
69  Quan Hoang Vuong, “Vietnam’s Political Economy in Transition (1986–2016),” Strat-
for, May 27, 2014. 
70  Quan Hoang Vuong et al., 2011.
71  Bui Tat Thang, “After the War: 25 Years of Economic Development in Vietnam,” (com-
mentary), NIRA Review, Tokyo: National Institute for Research Advancement, Spring 2000. 
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tion.72 Corruption itself was not new for Vietnam, but corruption at 
this precarious moment in SRV history significantly contributed to the 
further decline of SOE productivity. Those running illegal businesses 
continued receiving state subsidies while shirking became prevalent, 
thus further depressing productivity.73
Third, the VCP’s conquest of South Vietnam brought difficul-
ties even as the regime sought to use it to lay claims to nationalist 
legitimacy. The South Vietnamese were accustomed to capitalism, and 
anger and resistance were a consequence of VCP efforts to integrate 
South Korea’s open economy into North Korea’s centrally planned 
communist system.74 For one thing, forced collectivization diminished 
or eliminated past profits in agriculture. In addition, the Party viewed 
as “suspect” people with certain class backgrounds, most notably ex–
South Vietnamese leaders and the wealthy, who were subject to exclu-
sion unless put through political “rehabilitation.”75
Fourth, the death of Party legend Le Duan was another key 
factor in prompting the VCP to enact doi moi reforms. An original 
member of the communist revolutionary movement and cofounder of 
the Indochina Communist Party in 1930, he was a trusted adviser to 
the father of communist Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh, and Ho selected him 
to become First Party Secretary in 1959. Le Duan became General Sec-
retary in 1960 and remained in that position until his death in 1986. 
Prior to the Sixth Party Congress, he had been ill for many years and 
had struggled to read the Party’s report at the Fifth Party Congress 
in 1982.76 His death was important because it offered an opportunity 
to shift the VCP away from incremental changes to the command 
economy—Le Duan had actually supported many reforms—toward 
a bolder and wholesale reimagination of Vietnam’s economic model. 
72  London, 2009.
73  London, 2009.
74  Duiker, 1977.
75  Duiker, 1977; London, 2009.
76  Nguyen Van Canh, Vietnam Under Communism, 1975–1982, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 
University, Hoover Institution Press, 2017. 
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Fresh leaders would also have the opportunity to express their views 
and finally be in the position of decisionmaking.77 One of them in 
particular, Nguyen Van Linh, who served as general secretary from 
1986 to 1991, was instrumental in pushing doi moi forward. Linh had 
served as party secretary of Ho Chi Minh City since 1975 and was an 
advocate of market-based reforms. He was given fairly wide latitude to 
deviate from Party ideology (even though he was briefly removed from 
the Politburo), probably because of his experience as a communist revo-
lutionary and for having served as a leading political figure for the Viet 
Cong during the war.
Fifth, Vietnam’s 1978 invasion of Cambodia put a severe drain on 
already depleted state coffers, and the war resulted in Vietnam’s further 
international isolation. The Association for Southeast Asian Nations—
in conjunction with China, the United States, and other Western 
states—imposed economic sanctions on the SRV, with many parties 
canceling economic assistance altogether.78 Soviet subsidies were insuf-
ficient to cover the shortfall in revenues. Of all countries involved, 
China was particularly incensed that Vietnam would attack its Khmer 
Rouge ally in Cambodia. Beijing subsequently launched attacks along 
the China-Vietnam land border in 1979 to “teach Vietnam a lesson,” 
thus forcing Hanoi to expend even more resources. By 1982, Sino-
Soviet relations had recovered sufficiently that Beijing was no longer 
as concerned about losing influence to the Soviets and their proxies 
in Indochina. China therefore sought to “bleed Vietnam white” by 
encouraging it to stay longer to fight insurgency in Cambodia.79 
Finally, the series of economic reforms taking place within 
the Soviet Union in the mid-1980s had a significant impact on the 
77  One notable exception is the 1986 case of General Secretary Truong Chinh—a commu-
nist revolutionary who also strongly believed in the need for economic reforms and actively 
contributed to doi moi. Truong is given significant credit in Vietnam for the country’s turn 
to market-Leninism.
78  Vu Tuan Anh, 1994.
79  Vu Tuan Anh, 1994.
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VCP’s decision to move forward with doi moi.80 Perestroika, champi-
oned by Soviet leader Gorbachev, advocated transitioning SOEs into 
self-financing companies. Although potentially a form of revision-
ism according to Marxist ideologues, the SRV was able to accept the 
change to market economics, probably because it was coming from the 
originator of Hanoi’s own state-run socialism and its primary bene-
factor. On the latter point, and for practical purposes, the VCP was 
compelled to respond to perestroika because it led the steady drying 
up of annual Soviet economic assistance to Vietnam; by 1990, aid had 
completely been curtailed.81 
What Doi Moi Tells Us About Reform Prospects in North Korea
The period between North Vietnam’s conquest of South Vietnam in 
1975 and the Sixth Party Congress in 1986 featured a series of events 
that incentivized the VCP to undertake serious and systemic reforms 
to the command economy. Although North Korea probably shares the 
same trouble in delivering supplies to SOEs and goods and services 
to the people, it also would not seem to share any of the other indica-
tors of reform. For example, the Kim regime has not conquered South 
Korea and therefore does not have to deal with the sticky questions of 
how best to expand its administrative grid on the Korean Peninsula to 
capitalist markets without sacrificing elements of control. In addition, 
Pyongyang probably controls SOEs to a much greater extent, given the 
reach of Kim’s totalitarian regime compared with the “four centers” 
power model found in Vietnam. It is also questionable whether North 
Korea has any reformers in its ranks and, if it does, whether they are 
allowed to voice their unvarnished concerns and have real impact—put 
80  The Soviet Union’s perestroika had a significant impact on pushing the VCP toward 
doi moi, but it is very likely that leaders in Hanoi also closely assessed China’s “reform 
and opening up” (gaige kaifang) in 1978. Masahiko Ebashi argues that China’s reforms 
were one factor affecting Hanoi’s thinking (Masahiko Ebashi, “The Economic Takeoff,” 
in James W. Morley and Masashi Nishihara, eds., Vietnam Joins the World, New York: 
M. E. Sharpe, 1997, p. 40). The timing of doi moi ’s announcement, however, coincided 
with a prolonged period of China-Vietnam hostility, suggesting that Chinese economic 
reform ideas might have been less impactful than perestroika. 
81  Vu Tuan Anh, 1994.
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another way, whether there are any Nguyen Van Linhs in North Korea. 
At present, it is hard to say, but Kim Il-Sung’s death did not lead to 
any economic reforms of note; nor did Kim Jong-Il’s death appear to 
have opened up much meaningful space for widespread and systematic 
reforms that could compare with doi moi in Vietnam. Finally, North 
Korea’s economic reliance on China and Vietnam’s dependence on 
the Soviet Union for assistance during the Cold War might be some-
what similar on the surface, but North Korea depends more on China 
than Vietnam did on the Soviet Union, and China today has far more 
resources than the Soviet Union had in the 1980s.
Factors That Influenced Cuban Economic Reform 
Decisions
The Cuban government of Fidel Castro came to power through a pop-
ular revolutionary uprising in 1959 that ousted U.S.-backed dictator 
Fulgencio Batista. The Castro regime consolidated power by adopting 
a communist model and allying with the Soviet Union. It survived 
the U.S.-sponsored 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, the Central Intelligence 
Agency’s Operation Mongoose plots to assassinate Castro, and a major 
U.S–Soviet standoff in 1962 over Russian attempts to emplace nuclear 
missiles on the island. This tumultuous early period crystallized what 
would become five decades of nearly unremitting U.S. hostility, includ-
ing a comprehensive economic embargo designed to bring down the 
regime. Regime survival, characterized by two intertwined features—
perpetuation of the personalistic dictatorship of Castro and the preser-
vation of its state socialist model—was the overarching objective of the 
regime until 2006, when the ill and aging dictator relinquished power 
to his younger brother, Raúl Castro Ruz, who was formally elected 
president of the Council of State two years later. The younger Castro 
had served as chief of the army and de facto second in command for 
the preceding decades. Fidel Castro died in 2016, and Raúl Castro Ruz 
passed the reins to Miguel Diaz Canel in 2018, initiating Cuba’s transi-
tion to the post-Castro era.
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The dominant theme of political continuity in Cuba has 
been punctuated by two major periods in which the Cuban regime 
attempted, or was forced by circumstances, to open up to the world. 
Economic imperatives and emigration crises drove these fitful attempts 
at opening, though such measures were always carefully metered out of 
fear that political instability would ensue and the United States would 
capitalize on events to topple the regime. Fidel Castro deftly used both 
political repression and the fear of U.S. intervention to shore up his 
regime. He was the principal hardliner surrounded by various acolytes 
and apparatchiks of his revolutionary regime, who are only now pass-
ing from positions of power. His brother was known to be more prag-
matic and to prefer the models of China and Vietnam of introducing 
market reforms while maintaining political controls. Various reformers 
occupied positions of power during the 1990s, somewhat tenuously, 
but the economic changes adopted in those years were designed to 
extract economic benefit without risking any loss of political control or 
delegitimizing the regime through increased inequalities that market 
socialism would inevitably bring.
The Barack Obama administration, having assessed that 60 years 
of sanctions and ostracism had not produced the desired reforms or 
regime change, decided to pursue an opening to Cuba. Raúl Castro 
Ruz responded positively through secret negotiations conducted by his 
son Alejandro with two White House officials. The official bureaucra-
cies of both countries were kept in the dark because opponents of the 
opening likely would have squelched the effort. Although the subse-
quent restoration of formal diplomatic ties in July 2015 represented 
a historic milestone, the resulting economic and political changes 
in Cuba were relatively modest. U.S. legislation bars lifting the U.S. 
embargo until there are free elections and the Castro brothers have 
departed from power. To date, proposals to revise that legislation have 
not gained the necessary support.
For its part, Cuba appears far from a decision to hold free elec-
tions as of this writing. Fidel Castro’s long-standing paranoia of U.S. 
intentions came to the fore on the heels of a historic visit by President 
Obama to Havana, where he was greeted by enthusiastic crowds eager 
to see the first U.S. African-American president. Castro and the offi-
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cial Cuban media denounced Obama’s speech, and the 7th Party Con-
gress, which convened shortly thereafter, refrained from any additional 
economic opening steps. Even Raúl Castro Ruz was compelled to issue 
assurances that Cuba would not become a multiparty democracy or 
adopt capitalism on his watch.
Cuba’s modest economic reforms—self-employment for a half-
million Cubans, foreign investment in tourism and other sectors, and 
generous subsidized oil supplies from Venezuela—have enabled it to 
limp along. However, the crisis in Venezuela, lack of any substantial 
new donors, and the periodic destruction from hurricanes augur con-
tinued hardship for the country. The advent of the Trump administra-
tion led to harsh rhetoric and revocation of some measures taken by the 
Obama administration to liberalize travel, remittance, and investment 
flows from the United States. For the time being, any Cuban propen-
sity to open further appears to be checked by renewed official U.S. hos-
tility and the continued U.S. economic embargo. Over the longer run, 
economic and sociopolitical changes in Cuba that were set in motion 
by the limited economic opening and increased travel and tourism—
and by the passing of the revolutionary generation—will likely produce 
a slow transformation of Cuban society and its relationship with the 
world.
Factors in Cuban Decisionmaking
A Brief Warming in the 1970s
A brief opening by the Jimmy Carter administration led to the open-
ing of a U.S. Interests Section in Havana and a Cuban Interests Sec-
tion in Washington in 1977. Diplomatic efforts to create conditions for 
further opening did not bear fruit, and the Mariel exodus created sig-
nificant concerns over instability in both Havana and Washington.82 
Periodic outflows were used by Castro to relieve pent-up pressure, but 
the outpourings also threatened political destabilization and possible 
retaliation from the United States.
82 The Mariel exodus was a mass emigration of Cubans from Cuba’s Mariel Harbor to the 
United States between April and October 1980.
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Post-Soviet Shock and Reforms of the 1990s
The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 precipitated a severe eco-
nomic crisis and the specter of regime collapse in Cuba. Cuba had relied 
heavily on the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc for imports, including 
vital oil supplies. In 1991, total imports from the Soviet Union shrank 
by 71 percent, and oil imports of 13 million metric tons in 1989 plum-
meted to 8.6 million metric tons just two years later.83 The Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance also dissolved as regime change swept the 
Soviet bloc; Cuba’s total foreign trade dropped 75–80 percent between 
1989 and 1991, and its GDP contracted by more than 30 percent.84
Under this excruciating economic pressure, the Cuban regime 
declared a variety of emergency measures in what it labeled “the Special 
Period in the Time of Peace.” As food stocks dwindled, Cubans forced 
into near-starvation diets participated in an array of frenetic side hus-
tles to make ends meet. The regime grudgingly legalized very limited 
entrepreneurial activity by Cubans and began to aggressively court for-
eign investment and state-sponsored joint ventures in tourism, nickel 
mining, medical services, and oil exploration. The national assembly 
passed the Constitutional Reform Law in 1992, authorizing the open-
ing of farmer’s markets, private markets for industrial and handmade 
products, and certain specified categories of self-employment.
Workers on state farms were allowed to form cooperatives to use 
the land; in 1993, Cubans were permitted to hold convertible current 
and foreign currencies as Cuba sought to stimulate tourism and other 
foreign investment. The convertible Cuban peso was introduced, for-
eign trade was decentralized, and duty-free zones and industrial parks 
were created through a series of decrees from 1994 to 1996. By 1997, 
4,000 cooperatives had been created and 106,000 independent farms 
existed. By 1997, 160,000 self-employed Cubans, 162 foreign joint ven-
tures, and 827 foreign private firms were operating. By the govern-
83  Edward Gonzalez and David Ronfeldt, Cuba Adrift in a Postcommunist World, Santa 
Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, R-4231-USDP, 1992, p. v.
84  Banco Central de Cuba, Cuba’s Banking and Financial System, 2nd ed., 1998.
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ment’s assessment, government-owned state farms had shrunk from 
74 percent to 24.4 percent of the total number of farms.85
The principal debates in the 1990s revolved around the pace and 
extent of economic reforms to be introduced, not a wholesale change in 
the one-party state. Cuba’s Communist Party leadership agreed that the 
party should retain political power and the social safety net for Cubans. 
Fidel Castro was associated with the most-conservative positions; his 
brother was reputed to favor more-rapid adoption of market socialism 
along the lines of China and Vietnam.86 Despite the economic crisis, 
Fidel Castro’s hold on power was absolute, and no public or frontal chal-
lenge to him arose. The so-called duros, or hardliners, prevailed over 
the only publicly identified reformer when senior official and longtime 
Castro confident Carlos Aldana was dismissed from the Politburo and 
expelled from the party in October 1992 on corruption charges.
Raúl Castro Ruz was directly involved in promoting foreign 
investment through his position as the senior ranking general and min-
ister of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolutionarias. The Cuban army was 
entrusted with leading investments in construction and with operat-
ing the first tourism installations (through the Gaviota hotels chain), 
dollar stores, and other foreign currency–generating enterprises.87 Cuba 
claimed that tourist visits increased from 400,000 in 1991 to 600,000 
in 1993, with gross revenues of $530 million.
Concerns about emerging income disparities and loss of state con-
trol over the economy led to the national assembly imposing restric-
tions on self-employment in December 1993. Decree 141 was amended 
to favor cooperatives over individual businessmen; 140 categories of 
permitted self-employment were limited to repair shops, certain kinds 
of restaurants, and taxi drivers, and they were taxed at 49.9 percent.
Despite these restrictions, the very modest economic reforms suc-
ceeded in stabilizing Cuba’s economy and enabled a modest recovery. 
Several senior officials—including economy czar Carlos Lage Dávila, 
85  Banco Central de Cuba, 1998, p. 15.
86  Edward Gonzalez and David Ronfeldt, Storm Warnings for Cuba, Santa Monica, Calif.: 
RAND Corporation, MR-452-OSD, 1994, pp. 14–15.
87  Gonzalez and Ronfeldt, 1994, p. 23.
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finance minister José Luis Rodríguez García, and foreign minister 
Roberto Robaina González—quietly pushed for additional economic 
reforms and met with visiting journalists to aggressively tout oil explo-
ration leases, Cuba’s biotech industry, and tourism. Castro gave a series 
of interviews to prominent U.S. news media outlets as part of a charm 
offensive during the Bill Clinton administration, arguing for lifting of 
the U.S. embargo. The raft exodus crisis in 1994 revealed the depth 
of discontent and desperation; tens of thousands of Cubans set sail for 
Florida in rickety contraptions. This discontent led to a reimposition of 
central control over the economy. The outflow prompted the Clinton 
administration to detain migrants in Guantanamo Bay detention camp 
and then on U.S. bases in Panama. The influence of reformist officials 
was eventually curtailed when Robaina was dismissed as foreign minister 
on corruption charges and others were eased out of their positions.
No Political Opening Amid Increasing U.S. Pressure
During this period of Cuba’s principal economic reform and opening 
of its economy, European and Canadian governments responded with 
expanded trade and investment, but they coupled their overtures with 
calls for political liberalization and support for human rights activists. 
In 1996, the European Union adopted a “Common Position” to influ-
ence political liberalization and improve Cuba’s human rights record 
through engagement rather than through economic embargo as the 
United States had done. By 2001, the European Union was Cuba’s 
largest trade partner (it was subsequently surpassed by Venezuela in 
2002) and remained Cuba’s largest export market and largest source 
of FDI; it also accounted for roughly half of the tourists visiting Cuba 
in the 1990s.88 In 2003, the European Union adopted economic sanc-
tions following the jailing of 75 political dissidents in Cuba. 
During the 1990s, the U.S. government passed two significant 
pieces of legislation: the Cuba Democracy Act and the Helms-Burton 
“Libertad” bill, which aimed to squeeze the regime and bring about 
political liberalization. The regime reacted predictably by circling the 
88  Council on Hemispheric Affairs, “The European Union and Cuba: The Common Posi-
tion,” July 15, 2010.
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wagons in a repeat of the cycle of mutual hostility that had character-
ized the bilateral relationship since the 1960s.
A variety of factors account for the lack of political liberalization 
in Cuba. The regime’s Soviet bloc–trained security and intelligence 
services maintained a tight grip on the population. Although revolu-
tionary fervor waned dramatically and fewer citizens participated in 
watchdog activities (such as the Committees for the Defense of the 
Revolution) or the Communist Party, the regime used jobs, access to 
foreign currency, permission to travel abroad, and other means of con-
trol to suppress dissent. In the early decades of the revolution, U.S. hos-
tility shored up popular support for the revolution and Cuban national-
ism generally, but the immigration policies of the United States served 
as a significant escape valve for Cuban discontent. The Cuban Adjust-
ment Act of 1966 granted legal residency to Cubans who arrived in the 
United States. During the massive raft exodus crisis of the mid-1990s, 
migrants were housed offshore in an effort to stem the flow without 
altering this policy. The Clinton administration eventually granted a 
waiver permitting those Cuban migrants to come to the United States. 
The course of events in the former Soviet Union (particularly 
Russia) also served a cautionary function for Cuban leaders. The fates 
of Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin did not encourage Cuba to follow per-
estroika or glasnost, and the advent of populist and leftist governments 
in Latin America in the 2000s provided a community of like-minded 
regional leaders. Although only Venezuela and Brazil were in a position 
to provide substantial material support, other friendly governments in 
Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentina, Uruguay, and Nicaragua reduced Cuba’s 
sense of isolation.
Raúl Castro Ruz’s Accession and Further Reform in the 2000s
The collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s induced the first major 
period of changes in the Cuban system. The second wave of changes 
occurred after the ailing Fidel Castro passed the reins of power to his 
brother informally in 2006, a move that was formalized in 2008 with 
the election of Raúl Castro Ruz to president of the Council of State.
From 2004 to 2007, Cuba enjoyed the first real surge of eco-
nomic growth since the collapse of the Soviet bloc, with growth aver-
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aging 9 percent in these years. The global financial crisis and a series of 
storms caused a downturn in subsequent years, averaging 2.8 percent 
growth from 2011 to 2015. In 2008, the European Union provided a 
five-year package of development aid because relations had improved 
after the release of 14 political prisoners in 2005. After the release of 
52  prisoners in 2010, the European Union renewed multiyear assis-
tance in 2014.
In this same period, the United States took several steps to 
increase U.S.–Cuban exchanges across various areas. In 2000, the U.S. 
Congress passed the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhance-
ment Act of 2000, which authorized certain sales of food, medicines, 
and medical equipment to several countries, including Cuba.89 Those 
exports peaked in 2008, when Cuba began importing more from the 
European Union and Brazil. In 2009, Congress passed an appropria-
tions measure that eased restrictions on family travel and travel for the 
marketing of agricultural exports.90
In 2009, the Obama administration took further unilateral steps 
to change Treasury Department Office of Foreign Asset Conroll regu-
lations to permit family travel and family remittances to Cuba and in 
2011 to permit nonfamily remittances and educational and religious 
travel to the island.
In April 2011, Raúl Castro Ruz made his mark by introducing 
important economic reforms at the 6th Party Congress, such as per-
mission for Cubans to buy and sell real estate and cars, reduction of 
party oversight of state firms, a plan to move 20 percent of the island’s 
five million state employees to the private sector, reduction of govern-
ment oversight of the economy, and increased taxation. These moves to 
separate party and state functions and allow greater economic auton-
omy were coupled with the introduction of term limits and rotation in 
leadership posts.91
89  Public Law 106-387, Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration 
Appropriations Act, October 28, 2000.
90  Public Law 111-8, Omnibus Appropriations Act, March 11, 2009.
91  Eusebio Mujal-León, “Survival, Adaptation and Uncertainty: The Case of Cuba,” Jour-
nal of International Affairs, Vol. 65, No. 1, Fall/Winter 2011.
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In 2010–2011, the Catholic Church facilitated the release of 
125 political prisoners; another 53 prisoners were released as part of 
the U.S.–Cuban normalization of relations in 2015 (although some 
of those would be rearrested). The Cuban government appeared to 
make a policy shift toward short-term detentions in these years, pos-
sibly to achieve the desired domestic political effects without suffering 
the international opprobrium that long-term detentions had incurred.
Obama’s Opening to Cuba
President Obama’s moves to loosen restrictions on travel and remit-
tances made clear his desire to seek normalization of relations with 
Cuba. Legislation limited what he could do without the support of 
Congress. Only Congress could lift the embargo, which was the one 
change Cuba sought above all else. Nonetheless, the Obama adminis-
tration’s normalization of diplomatic relations in July 2015 marked a 
significant historic watershed in U.S.–Cuban relations.
The first overture was made at the funeral of South African leader 
Nelson Mandela in December 2013, when Obama shook Raúl Castro 
Ruz’s hand in full view of the crowd and international cameras. A 
series of back-channel meetings occurred with various intermediaries, 
notably Pope Francis and the Cuban cardinal, Jaime Ortega.92 Two 
of Obama’s White House aides went to Canada to meet secretly with 
Raúl’s son Alejandro, leaving official diplomats sidelined until the deal 
was struck.93 The release of Alan Gross, a U.S. aid worker imprisoned 
in Cuba, was a necessary condition for a deal. A parallel spy swap was 
arranged for Cuba to secure the release of the final three members of 
the “Cuban Five,” who had been sentenced and jailed for espionage in 
the United States.
In December 2014, just after the U.S. Congress recessed, the 
swap was made, and the Obama administration announced its inten-
92  Ruadhán Mac Cormaic, “Cardinal’s Secret U.S. Visit Paved Way for Obama-Castro 
Détente,” Irish Times, March 16, 2017; Katharine Q. Seelye, “Cardinal Jaime Ortega, a 
Cuban Bridge to the U.S., Dies at 82,” New York Times, July 26, 2019.
93  A senior U.S. diplomat surmised that secret talks were underway when one of the aides 
consulted him on various points (telephone interview with Jeffrey DeLaurentis, March 18, 
2019).
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tion to restore diplomatic ties, remove Cuba from the official list of 
state sponsors of terrorism, and seek further exchanges with the island. 
Technical talks ensued, Cuba was removed from the list in April 2015, 
diplomatic relations were formally restored in July 2015, and U.S. com-
mercial flights to Cuba began in August. A series of regulatory changes 
were made to allow further commercial activity and exchanges, such 
as the opening of mail, travel, and receiving offices in Cuba. In March 
2016, Obama traveled to Havana with his family, where they were 
greeted by enthusiastic crowds lining the streets.
The 7th Party Congress and the Advent of the Trump Administration
Following the historic U.S. presidential visit and the announcement of 
restoration of diplomatic relations without any major concessions on 
Cuba’s part, one might have expected Raúl Castro Ruz to be trium-
phal in his appearance before the Party Congress in April 2016. How-
ever, a public rebuke from his brother, a biting editorial in the Cuban 
Communist Party–controlled daily Granma, and the traditional use of 
the Party Congress to reaffirm the communist liturgy prompted him 
to offer a pugnacious conclusion to his own speech, making a series 
of demands that the United States lift the economic embargo, cease 
its democracy promotion programs in Cuba, return the naval base at 
Guantanamo, and stop pressuring fellow leftist Latin American gov-
ernments with what he called “unconventional warfare.” Reprising the 
suspicious stance that the Cuban regime has often adopted toward the 
United States, he added “There are more than a few U.S. government 
officials who, on recognizing the failure of their policy toward Cuba, 
make no attempt to disguise their affirmations that the goals remain 
the same, only the means are being modified.”94
The election of Trump as U.S. president in November 2016 set in 
motion a policy review that resulted in a June directive reversing some 
of the opening that the Obama administration had begun, but flights 
and cruise visits continued. In September 2017, Hurricane Irma caused 
severe damage to Cuba, reducing economic growth. The downturn 
94  “7th PCC Central Report, Presented by First Secretary Raúl Castro Ruz,” transcript, 
CubaDebate, April 18, 2016. 
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was compounded in 2018 when Brazil announced that it would sus-
pend a medical services agreement that provided $400 million annu-
ally to Cuba for medical professional services provided by Cuban doc-
tors in Brazil.
As of 2019, Cuba faced serious countertrends, as Venezuela’s 
crisis deepened with the imposition of U.S. sanctions on the govern-
ment in Caracas. Some U.S. officials, including members of Congress, 
appeared ready to extend the campaign of pressure from ousting Presi-
dent Nicolás Maduro Moros to forcing further change in Cuba. The 
historic pattern of stiffening resistance within Cuba could repeat itself, 
precluding the desired opening.
The economic changes instituted by Raúl Castro Ruz and the 
slow but inevitable passing of the revolutionary generation appear likely 
to transform Cuba more thoroughly over time.95 The loosening of state 
controls over Cubans has unleashed entrepreneurial energy, although 
the existence of a dual currency system and other constraints limit the 
effects. Increased travel; access to the internet, cell phones, and com-
puters; and cultural and educational exchanges have limited the Party’s 
control over Cuban society despite the official policy of maintaining 
a one-party political system.96 The Cuban regime remains afraid of 
the consequences of rapid economic change and prefers to meter its 
reforms lest it lose control.
Factors That Influenced North Korea’s Past Economic 
Reforms
In recent years, DPRK government pronouncements have placed 
heavy emphasis on economic development, and some observers say 
that Pyongyang might undertake substantial economic reform initia-
95  Richard E. Feinberg, Open for Business: Building the New Cuban Economy, Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2016.
96  Carmelo Mesa-Lago, “The Emerging Non-State Sector in Cuba’s Economy,” Latin Amer-
ican Research Review, Vol. 52, No. 1, July 2017; Grace Stainback, “Exploring the Cultural 
and Infrastructural Impacts of Consumerism on the New Cuba,” Hatfield Graduate Journal 
of Public Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2018.
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tives in the future.97 To understand the prospects of any such reforms, 
an understanding of the economic reform measures the country has 
undertaken in the past and the motivations for these could provide 
valuable insights into the DPRK leadership’s thinking. 
From the end of the Korean War until the 1970s, North Korea 
achieved respectable economic growth through a centrally planned eco-
nomic approach that focused on armaments, infrastructure, and heavy 
industry that was facilitated by substantial aid and technical advice 
from the Soviet Union and China. In the 1970s, however, the economy 
began to stagnate as it reached the inherent limitations of a socialist 
economic system.98 After defaulting on and refusing to pay back its 
international debt obligations in the 1970s,99 the economy remained 
sluggish into the early 1980s. In a bid to extract further resources from 
the international community, the DPRK government enacted a law in 
1984 designed to attract FDI; this was not, however, enough to lure 
substantial additional funds.100 From 1984 to 1989, only 100 contracts 
were made; 70 of them were from Korean-Japanese businessmen and 
only ten were from Western businesses. Out of 100, only 53 invest-
ments were actually implemented and few were profitable because of 
North Korea’s bureaucracy and lack of business infrastructure.
North Korea’s economy continued to decline throughout the 
1980s. In 1991, with the collapse of the Soviet Union (which had 
been North Korea’s principal trading partner and source of aid), the 
97  It is important to note that North Korea does not permit its officials to describe its eco-
nomic initiatives using the language of “reform” and routinely pillories the notion of apply-
ing the word itself to any DPRK economic policies. See Adrian Buzo, Politics and Leadership 
in North Korea, 2nd ed., New York: Routledge, 2017.
98  As happened in the other socialist countries, the DPRK economy started stagnating, 
mainly as a result of inefficient planning and decreased productivity from lack of motiva-
tion and innovation. See Paul Hare, “North Korea: Building the Institutions to Raise Living 
Standards,” International Economic Journal, Vol. 26, No. 3, September 2012.
99  Kim Youngnam, “N. Korean Debt to Sweden Remains Unpaid After Four Decades,” 
Voice of America, October 26, 2017. 
100 Besides the 1984 law, North Korea did not undertake any market-oriented reforms until 
the 1991 Rajin-Sonbong SEZ was initiated. In comparison, China implemented broader eco-
nomic reforms beginning in the late 1970s. 
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country’s economy began to grind to a halt. Following Moscow’s 1990 
lead, China recognized South Korea in 1992 and informed the DPRK 
regime that it would be reducing food, fuel, and other subventions and 
would require future payments to be made in hard currency. North 
Korea has rarely produced sufficient sustenance for its population, and 
DPRK leaders’ unwillingness to open up in reaction to these external 
developments resulted in a disastrous famine in the mid-1990s, during 
which between 1 and 3 million North Koreans are estimated to have 
perished.101 DPRK leaders favor economic developments that they can 
control, and they direct the benefits to the elite cadre. This type of 
benefit to a class of people can aid in managing support for the Kim 
family and others in the leadership circle. Engaging in broader eco-
nomic activity involving free market activities and international trade 
is more difficult to control and might stimulate economic and political 
forces that the regime could not control.
Despite the regime’s clear need for an alternative economic growth 
model, Kim Il-Sung undertook few steps toward economic reform 
prior to his death in 1994. Shortly thereafter, the country entered a 
prolonged period of food scarcity because of the lack of agricultural 
output.102 During the famine, which the regime dubbed “the Arduous 
March,” the DPRK government did little to address its domestic food 
shortage beyond requesting international aid. Pyongyang blamed its 
food shortages on flooding and drought, but it took no steps to open 
up as a way of staving off widespread food shortages. As food disap-
peared, the public distribution system largely broke down, and unoffi-
cial markets sprang up as the people started trading for food. The gov-
ernment’s control over the population weakened because it could not 
control people’s movements as they left their towns searching for food. 
Furthermore, the government could not enforce regulations as effec-
tively as people could avoid them by bribing bureaucrats. The unof-
101  Stephan M. Haggard and Marcus Noland, “North Korea’s External Economic Rela-
tions,” Peterson Institute of International Economics Working Paper No. 07-7, August 2007. 
Also see Andrew S. Natsios, The Great North Korean Famine: Famine, Politics, and Foreign 
Policy, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2001.
102  The most substantial step, the establishment of the Rajin-Sonbong Free Trade Zone, is 
discussed in this report’s subsection on SEZs.
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ficial market activities that emerged during this period continue in the 
present day.
Since the famine, the DPRK government has intermittently exper-
imented with two basic types of economic reforms: regulatory reforms 
and the establishment of SEZs. Regulatory reforms were intended 
either to incorporate unofficial market activities into the official 
system or to deter (or reverse) spontaneous growth of market activities. 
The government’s goals in these cases were not to introduce a market 
economy but to regain control over the economic system for the state 
and quash private-sector economic activity. This a key difference from 
when China and Vietnam engaged in economic reform that led to 
broad economic growth and in limited efforts designed to garner eco-
nomic benefits for SOEs or ventures controlled by an elite cadre. The 
DPRK government’s attempts were met with broad evasion and were 
largely unsuccessful, though they did damage economic productivity. 
The regime’s establishment of SEZs appears more like an attempt to 
establish a market economy. Although North Korea has experimented 
with multiple forms of SEZs since the establishment of the Rajin- 
Sonbong SEZ in 1991, these efforts, with the notable exceptions of 
the Mt. Kumgang tourism program and the Kaesong Industrial Zone, 
have not been successful in bringing in much foreign investment. The 
following section examines these in more depth. 
North Korea’s Post-Famine Economic Reforms
July 1, 2002, Reforms
The government enacted another economic reform in 2002, but the 
goal was to recognize officially the changes already happening in the 
market rather than to improve the economy. On July 1, 2002, the gov-
ernment increased product prices and labor wages comparable to the 
prevalent unofficial market prices. The price of rice, for example, was 
increased from 0.8 won/kg to 40 won/kg.103 Before the economic crisis, 
such low prices allowed the government to provide necessities to the 
people almost for free. During the famine, the government had no way 
103  Christopher D. Hale, “Real Reform in North Korea? The Aftermath of the July 2002 
Economic Measures,” Asian Survey, Vol. 45, No. 6, 2005.
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to incentivize production, had little to distribute, and therefore was 
unable to provide necessities. Many people left the cooperative farms 
or the state-owned factories and started farming in whatever lands they 
could use and working in the unofficial markets. In these unofficial 
markets, prices were set by demand and supply, and the scarce food and 
necessities were traded at much higher prices. To bring back the people 
to the farms and factories, the government had to pay higher prices and 
salaries. Additionally, to reflect the prevalent market rate, the govern-
ment adjusted the official foreign exchange rate from 2.15 won/dollar 
to 150 won/dollar.104 After the reform, market prices continued to rise, 
diverging again from the official prices, and the public distribution 
system never recovered.
Pyongyang also gave more autonomy to SOEs. Because the gov-
ernment could no longer provide subsidies to them, it required them 
to source their own raw materials and cover their own costs of produc-
tion. With this step, it also allowed them to make some business deci-
sions, such as what types of products to produce and how many—as 
long as they could meet production quotas. (In addition to quotas, the 
government also retained power over personnel decisions, such as hiring 
and firing.) Reportedly, some government-owned restaurants and stores 
transitioned to a type of semi-recognized private ownership at this time. 
These private parties could own their businesses by paying a rent and 
dividing profits with the government.105 Because the regime was focused 
on survival and largely incapable of operating factories and restaurants, 
authorities largely tolerated these measures as a way to extract resources 
from society in the form of bribes and protection money.
In contrast to policies in the areas of pricing, labor, and private-
sector firms, the government conducted a market-oriented agricultural 
experiment in which it implemented a “land-lease” program in two 
cities in the Hampyong province. In this program, farmers leased plots 
from what were previously collective farms and kept a certain por-
104 Hale, 2005.
105  Hale, 2005.
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tion of the produce.106 It appears that while trying to restore the ration 
system, the regime also sought to experiment with Chinese-style agri-
cultural reform. North Korea implemented a fully extended agricul-
tural reform in 2012 (see that subsection for more details).
In summary, these reforms allowed those affected—enterprise 
managers, business owners, and some farmers—to trade in markets 
and capture profits. Though largely reactive, these reforms exposed 
the overall economy to market supply and demand signals to a limited 
extent.
2002–2009 Reforms
Following the July 1, 2002, reforms, the DPRK government imple-
mented measures that were largely inconsistent and detrimental to the 
economy, most of them aimed at recovering the regime’s control over 
the economy. For example, in 2002, the DPRK government announced 
that the euro, not the U.S. dollar, would be the official foreign currency 
against which the won would be benchmarked, although the general 
population continued using dollars in the unofficial markets.107 In 
2003, some unofficial farmers’ markets were transformed into official 
markets, but these were not attractive for the traders because market 
prices were higher in the unofficial markets; also, the unofficial mar-
kets (although not legitimate) were still protected by the bribed offi-
cials.108 In 2005, the government banned the sale of rice in the official 
markets, but this led to broad resistance.109 The government also tried 
to reduce market activities with an aim of eradicating all such activities 
by the late 2000s. For example, in 2007, the government announced 
106 In the previous system, farmers had to sell all their produce to the government at set 
prices and buy their food through the official system at the subsidized prices. 
107  Jae-Cheon Lim, “Institutional Change in North Korean Economic Development Since 
1984: The Competition Between Hegemonic and Non-Hegemonic Rules and Norms,” 
Pacific Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 1, Spring 2009.
108 Tat Yan Kong, “The Political Obstacles to Economic Reform in North Korea: The Ultra 
Cautious Strategy in Comparative Perspective,” Pacific Review, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2014.
109 Eun-Lee Joung, “North Korea’s Economic Policy as a Duet with Control and Relaxation: 
Dynamics Arising from the Development of Public Markets Since the North Korean Fam-
ines in the 1990s,” Journal of Asian Public Policy, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2016.
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a ban on women under age 40 trading in the markets but then failed 
to compel the enforcement.110 In 2009, the government enacted a cur-
rency reform with a week’s notice that required all holders of DPRK 
won to convert their currency into a newly issued version at punitive 
rates, destroying much of the privately held wealth in the country while 
sucking some assets into the government’s coffers. This caused massive 
confusion and hurt the economy badly; it also caused many DPRK 
elites to distrust the financial system and hoard foreign currencies.111 
After the currency reform, North Korea had an economic depression 
and did not enact any further major reforms until 2012.
The June 28, 2012, and May 30, 2014, Reforms
After assuming power in late 2011, Kim Jong-Un enacted two major 
reforms in 2012 and 2014. These reforms aimed at increasing pro-
ductivity and efficiency by decentralizing economic decisionmaking, 
reducing the government’s role in such decisionmaking, and incen-
tivizing productivity through profit-sharing. Companies were given 
almost full autonomy; managers could make business plans and day-
to-day decisions and were also permitted to determine wages for labor. 
With this, labor income could be differentiated according to produc-
tivity and skill. In agriculture, farmers were broken into small groups 
of five to eight people, each of which was given land for cultivation and 
full autonomy over production decisions, with output split with the 
government. In 2012, the farmers’ share was set at 30 percent (70 per-
cent to the government), a figure that was increased to 60 percent in 
2014 (with 40 percent to government).112 The government also moved 
to decontrol some prices while still setting others for certain key prod-
ucts.113 The government also redefined its role from direct, detailed 
planning to a more removed role in setting an overall strategy.
110  Lim, 2009; Kong, 2014. 
111  Kong, 2014.
112  Chung H. Lee, “A Study of the DPRK’s Economic Policy Through the Seventh Party 
Convention” (in Korean), Review of North Korean Studies, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2016.
113  Lee, 2016.
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SEZs
Since the 1980s, the DPRK government has sought to attract foreign 
capital; at the same time, fearing the loss of control, the regime has 
tended to establish SEZs where FDIs and market economy rules were 
permitted but also hived off from the rest of the country.
Rajin-Sonbong SEZ, 1991–Present
In 1991, North Korea established an SEZ in the Rajin-Sonbong region 
to attract FDI from capitalist countries. However, the SEZ was largely 
unsuccessful and most of the investment went into service sector busi-
nesses, such as hotels, casinos, and restaurants. In 2010, the DPRK 
government designated Rajin as a special city and signed a US$10 bil-
lion project with the Chinese government.114 Under the plan, the Chi-
nese government acquired 50-year use rights for the three piers at the 
port. China subsequently repaired the Rajin port and built logistics 
warehouses. China also rebuilt the highways and a bridge connecting 
the country to Rajin. Russia also joined the project, agreeing to forgive 
90  percent of North Korea’s debt and pledging US$300  million in 
additional investments. Russia repaired the railways connecting Rajin 
to Russia’s Khasan city, and trains started running in 2013. Russia also 
repaired one of Rajin’s piers to handle 4 to 5 million tons of goods.115 
However, these projects stalled after Kim turned on his uncle (who 
was leading the project), purging and executing Jang Song-Thaek in 
late 2013.116 During their 2018 summits, Kim and Chinese leader Xi 
Jinping reportedly discussed reinstating the Rajin development.117
114  Under the Belt and Road Initiative, the Chinese government wants to develop the Rajin 
port to export products from China’s northeastern region; Rajin is attractive to China 
because it is a warm water port that does not freeze during the winter and thus could provide 
year-round access to the Pacific Ocean. 
115  B. H. Cho, North Korea’s Special Economic Zone Development Trend and Inter-Korean 
Cooperation (북한의 경제특구 개발 동향과 남북협력 연계방안), Seoul: Korea Develop-
ment Institute, September 2014.
116  Kim’s uncle-in-law Jang was executed in December 2013. One accusation was that he was 
trying to sell national property to a foreign country.
117  Multiple Korean news outlets reported that they discussed development of North Korea’s 
SEZs. See, for example, Choi Ik-Jae (최익재), “Kim Jong-Un Demands Xi Jinping to Negotiate 
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The Sinuiju Special Administrative Region, 2002
In 2002, North Korea announced that Sinuiju, which sits on the 
border with the Chinese city of Dandong, would henceforth be desig-
nated as a Special Administrative Region. The city was reportedly to 
be given full autonomy, with its own legal system and administration, 
and Yang Bin, a Dutch citizen of Chinese origin, was to be appointed 
as a governor. The project was abruptly halted when Yang was arrested 
by the Chinese authorities for tax evasion.118 Kim appears to be keen 
on developing the region. In 2013, the DPRK government announced 
14 SEZs, including Sinuiju.119 In 2014, North Korea allegedly signed 
a deal with a Hong Kong–based conglomerate to develop Sinuiju, and 
after Yang was released from his full term in 2018, he was reportedly 
looking to reestablish his business ties with North Korea.120 It is also 
reported that Kim discussed Sinuiju development with Xi during their 
2018 summit and that Kim visited the region late last year.121
The Kaesong Industrial Complex, 2002
In 2002, Kaesong municipality was designated an industrial region, with 
North and South Korea agreeing to develop it as an industrial park at 
which Republic of Korea (ROK) firms could employ DPRK labor in 
producing goods for export. Hyundai, a major ROK conglomerate, led 
the land development, and the park started its operation in 2005 with 
15 ROK companies. By 2015, the number of ROK businesses had grown 
to 125, employing an estimated 55,000 North Koreans and manufac-
with Four North Korean Bases (김정은, 시진핑에 북한 4대 거점 경협 요구),” JoongAng Ilbo 
(중앙일보), June 6, 2018. 
118  Hale, 2005.
119  Y. H. Kim, “Kim Jong-Un Administration’s Economic Reform Evaluation for the Second 
Year in Power (집권 2년차, 김정은 정권의 경제개혁 평가),” KDI North Korea Economic 
Review (KDI 북한경제리뷰), March 2014.
120 “N. Korean, Hong Kong Firms to Develop Border City of Sinuiju,” Yonhap News 
Agency, March 12, 2014; Katsuji Nakazawa, “Chinese Billionaire Who Plotted with North 
Korea Pops Up After 16 Years,” Nikkei Asian Review, October 25, 2018.
121  “North Korea’s Central Broadcaster: ‘Kim Jong-Un Inspects Sinuiju and Maps Con-
struction Plans’ (북한 중앙방송 “김정은, 신의주 시찰하고 건설계획 지도),” Maekyung 
Economics, November 16, 2018. 
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turing US$563 million worth of products annually, roughly 50 percent 
of which were textiles.122 Nevertheless, ROK businesses suffered from 
North Korea’s arbitrary policies, especially two sudden closings induced 
by spiking inter-Korean political tensions. In 2009, North Korea uni-
laterally announced that it was scrapping the agreed-on wage and rent 
agreements that it had with ROK firms and went on to demand wage 
increases.123 In 2012, North Korea demanded that additional taxes be 
paid by some companies.124 In 2013, North Korea blocked ROK access 
to the region and pulled out DPRK laborers, eventually leading to a 
complete shutdown. Although the Kaesong facilities were reopened later 
that year, the ROK government shut down the park in 2016 in protest 
of DPRK nuclear tests. (It remains closed at present.)125 Kim suggested 
reopening the Kaesong industrial park in his 2019 New Year’s remarks.126
The Wonsan–Mount Kumgang Special Tourist Zone, 2002
In 1998, ROK tourists first started visiting Mt. Kumgang, and in 
2002, the DPRK government designated the region as a special tourist 
zone. Hyundai led the development of Mt. Kumgang. In July 2008, 
a 53-year-old ROK tourist was shot dead by a DPRK soldier after she 
wandered off the tour route and into what Pyongyang described as “a 
military area.” Tours of Mt. Kumgang were suspended and then ceased 
altogether by the ROK government.127 In his 2019 New Year’s remarks, 
Kim suggested reopening the tourist zone.
122 Kaesong Industrial District Management Committee, homepage, undated. 
123 “N. Korea Withdraws Demand for Steep Wage Hike at Joint Park,” Yonhap News 
Agency, September 11, 2009. 
124 Yonhap News Agency, “S. Korean Firms in Gaeseong Complex Plagued by North’s 
Hefty Taxes,” Korea Times, October 18, 2012. 
125  “Kaesong Talks: North and South Korea Reach Agreement,” BBC, July 7, 2013.
126 Michael R. Gordon and Andrew Jeong, “Kim Jong Un Extends Peace Overture to U.S.,” 
Wall Street Journal, January 1, 2019.
127 Jon Herskowitz and Kim Junghyun, “South Korean Tourist Shot Dead by North Sol-
dier,” Reuters, July 11, 2008. 
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Hwanggumpyong and Wihwa Islands Free Trade Zone and Other 
Development Zones
In 2011, the DPRK and Chinese governments announced an agree-
ment to develop the islands of Hwanggumpyong and Wihwa at the 
mouth of the Yalu River (adjacent to Dandong and Sinuiju) into a free 
trade zone focused on four sectors: information, tourism, agriculture, 
and light industry. China was to build roads, ports, and electrical and 
internet networks. The project was stopped shortly after Jang was exe-
cuted in 2013. Allegedly, the development of this region was discussed 
during the Kim-Xi summit. After their third summit in 2018, Kim 
visited the region.128
Additionally, from 2013 to 2015, a total of 21 additional regions 
were designated as economic development zones, with 17 addition-
ally designated as “regional” economic development zones. For these 
regional zones, the government purportedly drew up economic devel-
opment plans designed to take advantage of regional strengths and 
comparative advantages. The government reportedly was actively 
developing relevant laws for these up until 2015.129
Understanding DPRK Motivations for Economic Reform
What motivated DPRK leaders over the past 35 years to pursue the 
various economic reform initiatives described in the previous sections? 
Was the regime attempting, if unsuccessfully, to move away from cen-
tral planning and toward a market economy? Or were DPRK leaders 
motivated by other goals?
Kim Il-Sung certainly did not undertake economic reforms to 
move toward a market economy. Despite widespread evidence on his 
watch of North Korea’s economic decline, South Korea’s economic 
boom, the Soviet Union’s collapse, and China’s rise, his only two 
reform initiatives were the 1984 FDI law and the establishment of the 
128  Kim Da-Hye (김다혜), “Kim Jong-Un Visited Pyeongbuk-Sindo-Gun on the Border with 
China (김정은 방중 후 첫 행보는 중국접경 평북 신도군 시찰),” News1, June 30, 2018. 
129 J. H. Hong, North Korean Economy in the Kim Jong-Un Regime for 5 Years: Focusing on 
Economic Policy (김정은 정권 5년의 북한경제: 경제정책을 중심으로), Seoul: Korea Insti-
tute for National Unification, 2017.
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Rajin-Sonbong SEZ in 1991.130 He implemented no other economic 
reform initiatives, nor was he focused on raising living standards or 
adjusting his economic plans in light of their failure.131
Kim Jong-Il similarly does not appear to have undertaken any 
of his economic reform initiatives to fundamentally shift the basis of 
the DPRK economy in the direction of greater openness or reliance 
on markets. Despite some initial hopeful analyses suggesting that his 
2002 reform would open the system up, those measures were intended 
not to adopt a market economy so much as to rebuild the official ration 
system by positioning it to better compete with the market and reestab-
lish control over the population. Similarly, the government permitted 
the companies some autonomy not because they wanted to incentivize 
the managers (and thereby increase productivity) but because the gov-
ernment could not provide raw materials and was, in essence, making 
a virtue of necessity. Between 2005 and 2008, Pyongyang took a series 
of steps intended to reverse the growth of market activities. Although 
these countermeasures largely failed, they nonetheless indicated the 
regime’s deep interest under Kim Jong-Il in preserving control at the 
expense of economic growth. Kim Jong-Il differed from Kim Il-Sung 
in his greater openness to foreign capital, though this might simply 
have been a function of the regime’s greater desperation in the wake of 
the Soviet collapse and China’s reduction in assistance.
Kim Jong-Un’s economic reforms, though still limited, appear to be 
more market-oriented than those of either his grandfather or his father. 
In agriculture, for example, farmers are now allowed to retain up to 
60 percent of their produce. Similarly, the government gave companies 
full autonomy to incentivize the managers and thereby increase produc-
tivity. Moreover, unlike his father, whose key policy line was “military 
first” (son’gun), Kim Jong-Un has made it clear that his national priority 
is “dual advance” (byungjin), or simultaneous emphasis on the buildup of 
130 The Rajin-Sonbong Special Economic Zone was established in 1991 (before Kim Il-Sung 
died in 1994). However, this might have been Kim Jong-Il’s initiative: Although officially he 
assumed power only after his father’s death, he had taken over much of the day-to-day run-
ning of the country by the early 1980s.
131  Buzo, 2017. 
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the country’s nuclear arsenal and the achievement of economic develop-
ment; more recently, Pyongyang has proclaimed that the development of 
its nuclear and ballistic missile arsenals is basically complete, so attention 
can now shift more fully to economic construction.
If Kim Jong-Un decides to undertake major economic reforms, 
several factors from the regime’s past might shape the way he goes 
about doing so. For example, unofficial market activities have become 
fundamental to the overall DPRK economy. In 2000, the unofficial 
market economy was estimated to account for between 25 percent and 
50 percent of the total economy.132 Today, the DPRK government lit-
erally could not operate without the money flowing from the unof-
ficial markets. There is a symbiotic relationship between the DPRK 
government and the unofficial markets that works at both individual 
and organizational levels. Because government officials cannot live on 
their low official salaries, they accept bribes to allow market activities 
and/or trade on such markets. Because the government cannot fund 
the national projects, it receives investments from private investors 
(donju).133 Kim likely knows that if he tries to repudiate market devel-
opment, government operations will also be disrupted.
Moreover, according to some analyses, North Korea is experi-
encing a shift in its core power elite, witnessing a rising generation of 
young, second-generation offspring of high officials who have profited 
from illicit trade and from their families’ roles in key SOEs.134 Such 
elites might be Kim’s nucleus of supporters, and they are likely to want 
132  Andrei Lankov, “The New Leader, The New Economic Model,” in William H. Overholt, 
ed., North Korea: Peace? Nuclear War? Cambridge, Mass.: Mossavar-Rahmani Center for 
Business and Government, 2019.
133  The market activities created a new entrepreneur-investor class called donju (“master of 
money”) that amassed significant wealth through the market. Members of this class have 
become owners of the businesses and investors in many of the government businesses. They 
provide bribes to the government officials and share the profits with the governments. Under 
Kim Jong-Un’s leadership, donju are encouraged to invest in government projects and SOEs. 
See Lankov, 2019.
134 “Interfering with Various Interests of the North Korean Version of the ‘President’ and 
Taking Bribes (북한판 ‘태자당’ 각종 이권 개입하며 뇌물 받아),” Voice of America 
(미국의 소리), December 1, 2010. 
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the economy to continue to develop so they can amass wealth.135 Kim 
also likely calculates that achieving a certain level of economic growth 
and stability is required to maintain domestic political stability.
Therefore, Kim’s pathway to any reforms might be strewn with 
substantial internal obstacles resulting from past economic steps. Vested 
interests might oppose true opening up that would deprive them of the 
chance to earn rents (trading on their privileged access to resources 
and markets). North Korea’s past efforts to engage in limited, tactical 
economic reforms have also laid down a marker that will lead many to 
regard Kim with skepticism, including people he needs to believe in 
his leadership and reform efforts, which means he will have to expend 
additional resources to build credibility if he wants reforms to actually 
launch and take hold.
Conclusions
As demonstrated by this review of economic reform decisionmaking in 
communist regimes, the factors that tend to stand out when it comes 
to economic policy change appear to correlate highly among these 
regimes’ calculations about what they need to do to stay in power. 
When famines have broken out in China and North Korea, the regimes 
have weathered these without dramatically changing their policies; for 
Vietnam, however, when the emergence of large-scale hunger appeared 
likely to lead to major societal resistance to the regime in Hanoi, VCP 
leaders opted to relax their grip on the economy to encourage growth. 
In all cases, reform only took place when powerful leaders who were 
opposed to economic liberalization died or were eased aside. In the 
cases of Cuba and North Korea, even the loss of a great-power patron 
who provided enormous ideological and/or material resources was 
not enough to spur change. However, such a loss did provide a more 
permissive environment in Vietnam for the VCP to adopt economic 
reform policies in a context of eroding government finances and con-
135  They are known to enjoy lavish consumption and the Western lifestyle. See Anna Fifield, 
“North Korea’s One-Percenters Savor Life in ‘Pyonghattan,’” Washington Post, May 14, 2016. 
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trol over the economy, the emergence of hunger, and the rise of a new 
generation in the wake of Le Duan’s death. Similar situations occurred 
in Cuba and (to a limited extent) in North Korea.
Although these findings are preliminary and based on a limited 
number of case studies, they nonetheless suggest that it is unlikely 
that Pyongyang will adopt a radically new policy direction overnight 
absent a very dramatic forcing event. Some recent analyses have sug-
gested that the sanctions regime has been beginning to show increas-
ing effect, although (as noted at the outset) such external pressures are 
often mediated by intervening variables, such as the reaction to sanc-
tions pressures by politically important elites and their expectations of 
the DPRK leadership.136 Pyongyang’s increasing need to replace lost 
revenues explains the pressure on officials posted abroad to generate 
funds to support the regime, spurring a wave of reported defections 
and disappearances and prompting the regime to recall many of its key 
diplomats for ideological and loyalty screening.137 
Under such circumstances, despite Kim’s claim to be abandoning 
byungjin in favor of a single-minded focus on economic development, 
it seems likely that his administration will pursue its own tradition of 
tactical or unwilling informal opening up, followed by a reimposition 
of control at the earliest opportunity. In so doing, the Kim regime 
would be both following in the footsteps of Cuba and drawing on its 
own past experiences.
We conclude that the cases studied here do have several factors in 
common, although no single factor emerges as the sole predictor of a 
communist regime’s decision to open up its economy to free markets, 
foreign investment, and more international trade (Table 2.1).
These factors include, most notably, a rapid deterioration in cen-
tral government finances, a relaxation in the necessity for ideological 
purity (linked in the cases of Vietnam and Cuba to prior decisions by 
136 Joshua Stanton, “The ‘Experts’ Were Wrong. The Sanctions Are Working,” Free Korea, 
April 23, 2019. 
137  Lukas Mikelionis, “North Korea’s Top Diplomat in Italy Defected, Embarrassing Kim Jong 
Un,” Fox News, January 3, 2019; Julian Ryall, “North Korea Recalls Diplomats to Undergo 
‘Ideological Examinations’ After Embarrassing Defections,” The Telegraph, March 29, 2019. 
52    North Korean Decisionmaking
China and the Soviet Union to pursue economic liberalization, thus 
providing Hanoi and Havana with a measure of political cover)—and, 
most important, the removal from office or death of key leaders who 
had opposed reform. Other factors also affect reform decisions, such as 
incipient famine and widespread demands for improvement in living 
conditions that threaten to shake the regime’s grip on power, spreading 
corruption and the erosion of control over the state-led sector of the 
economy, and/or the loss of a great-power patron.
The policies of the United States in either encouraging these 
regimes to open up or sanctioning them for their foreign policies or 
domestic abuses does not appear to have figured directly in most of 
these instances of communist reform decisionmaking. Most of these 
governments were under some degree of economic pressure from the 
United States and continued to have challenging relationships with 
Washington, but their decisions to reform do not appear to be a direct 
outgrowth of either U.S. threats to impose harsher sanctions or U.S. 
offers of assistance if the regimes move toward economic liberalization. 
The United States certainly should continue to use carrots and sticks in 
an attempt to move North Korea toward a new approach to governing, 
economic development, and the conduct of its foreign relations, but the 
effects of such incentives are likely to be felt somewhat indirectly and 
to work only if the Kim regime perceives that it is facing a situation in 
which U.S.-led sanctions are putting its continued survival at risk.
Table 2.1
Factors Shaping Communist Economic Reform Initiative Decisions
Factor China Vietnam Cuba North Korea
Removal of leader opposed to opening X X X
Scarcity of food and consumer goods X X X X
Hyperinflation X
Loss of foreign aid and patronage X X X
Economic sanctions X X X
Expansion of illicit markets X X
Declining central government finances X X X X
Loosening ideology X X X
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CHAPTER THREE
Conventional Deterrence on the Korean 
Peninsula: Two Scenarios for Analysis
Some key historical elements have shaped the integrity of deterrence on 
the Korean Peninsula. On June 26, 1950, in the early morning hours, 
the DPRK Army launched a large ground offensive across the 38th par-
allel into South Korea. North Korea’s aim was to quickly destroy the 
fragile ROK Army standing in its way as it moved south to unite the 
two Koreas under its control. Unfortunately for the North Koreans, 
the United States moved Japan-based ground forces with air support 
onto the Peninsula in early July, which ultimately stopped the DPRK 
Army and eventually evicted it from all of South Korea.1
The lesson that the North Koreans drew from that experience that 
still resonates today is that if they want to have freedom of action—
whether political or military—the most optimal condition is to keep 
1  See Allan Millet, The War For Korea: They Came from the North, Lawrence, Kan.: Uni-
versity Press of Kansas, 2010; and Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the 
Yalu, June 1950–November 1950, Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1961. For 
a recent historiographical survey of Korean War literature, see James I. Matray, “Korea’s War 
at 60: A Survey of the Literature,” Cold War History, Vol. 11, No. 1, February 2011; James F. 
Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Vol. III, The Joint Chiefs of 
Staff and National Policy, 1950–1951, The Korean War, Part 1, Washington, D.C.: Office of 
Joint History, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1998; Walter G. Hermes, 
Truce Tent to Fighting Front, Washington, D.C., Center of Military History, 1966; Morton 
Halperin, Peter Hayes, Thomas Pickering, Leon Sigal, and Philip Yun, “From Enemies to 
Security Partners: Pathways to Denuclearization in Korea,” Nautilus Peace and Security 
Network Net Policy Forum, July 6, 2018; Tim Shorrock, “Can the United Nations Com-
mand Become a Catalyst for Change on the Korean Peninsula?” National Interest, November 
1, 2018; and Shawn Patrick Creamer, “The United Nations Command and Sending States,” 
unpublished monograph, undated.
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U.S. forces off the Korean Peninsula—or, at a minimum, keep the 
United States from reinforcing the forces that are already there.
Since the Korean War ended in 1953, the ROK military—along 
with the United States and the military forces it has deployed to the 
Korean Peninsula—has maintained a generally conventional deterrence 
posture that has prevented North Korea from trying to repeat what 
it attempted in summer 1950. But that does not mean conventional 
deterrence on the Peninsula has not been tested over the years. Recent 
examples of conventional deterrence being tested are North Korea’s 
sinking of the ROK Navy ship Cheonon in March 2010, North Korea’s 
artillery bombardment of Yeon Pyong Island eight months after that, 
and skirmishes in May and June 2014 associated with the Northern 
Limit Line.2 In each of these cases, the North Koreans walked up to 
the line but always seemed willing to back down. Conventional deter-
rence seems to have kept the situation from escalating.
What factors affect DPRK thinking and decisionmaking about 
conventional deterrence and escalation on the Korean Peninsula? This 
chapter outlines two plausible future scenarios based on currently 
available information. These scenarios inevitably entail some specula-
tion about the future with the intent of stimulating discussion about 
how things might evolve in the future. They are not designed to pre-
dict the future; rather, the objective of this exploratory approach is 
to identify gaps in information that might stimulate new collection 
requirements, revisiting information collected in the past and encour-
aging exploratory “what if” thinking. Following a brief discussion of 
the background for the two scenarios, we present two scenarios in the 
year 2022 in which conventional deterrence erodes and fails. The sce-
narios are designed to explore the critical factors that could affect the 
thinking of Kim and senior DPRK officials during an evolving crisis 
and what might lead North Korea to attack ROK and U.S. forces sta-
tioned on the Peninsula.
2  James Pearson and Ju-min Park, “The War That Never Ends Between the Koreas,” 
Reuters, June 16, 2014.
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The Two Scenarios
Before laying out the two scenarios, we note the Road to War we used 
on both scenarios. The idea that Kim would order an outright offen-
sive or military strikes into South Korea is unlikely when relations on 
the Korean Peninsula are relatively stable or even if there are some ten-
sions between the regime, South Korea, and the United States. Instead, 
for North Korea to launch military strikes or an offensive, there prob-
ably needs to be a provocation cycle that is robust enough to lead the 
DPRK regime to embrace the risk of starting a war. The Road to War 
used in both scenarios aims to do just this. In this chapter, we focus on 
security conditions in South Korea (Scenario 1: “Weaker ROK Army”) 
and on the ROK alliance with the United States (Scenario 2: “Com-
bined Forces Command [CFC] in Trouble”) as key factors influencing 
the integrity of conventional deterrence. Thus, the Road to War is kept 
intentionally short so that more time can be spent on the conditions 
surrounding the erosion of conventional deterrence.
The first scenario is centered on ROK President Moon Jae-In’s 
2018 defense policy that aimed to reorient the ROK military over the 
following five to seven years toward high-tech weaponry in the ROK 
Navy and Air Force. In Moon’s vision for ROK defense and security 
policy, the ROK Army would accept cutbacks in funding, which would 
reduce the total number of ROK Army combat divisions, and, impor-
tantly, lessen the conscription period for ROK males from 22 months to 
18. The Moon administration’s shift in ROK defense policy also con-
tains a significant change in the primary threat posed to South Korea—
away from North Korea as the primary threat and toward regional com-
petitors, such as China and Japan. As a result of these changes in ROK 
defense and security policy projected into a future scenario in 2022, Kim 
and North Korea might sense a weakening of South Korea’s conven-
tional military capabilities.
In the second scenario, conventional military deterrence for 
South Korea weakens in a different way. Unlike in the first scenario, 
which is premised on the recent Moon administration defense reforms, 
the advantage that North Korea sees in 2022 in the second scenario 
stems from a strategic shift in the security relationship between the 
56    North Korean Decisionmaking
United States and South Korea. As projected in this scenario, both the 
U.S. and ROK governments agree to abolish the longstanding U.S.-led 
United Nations Command (UNC) and CFC. Thus, where a U.S. four-
star general had been in command of the UNC since 1952 and the 
CFC since 1978, in 2022, a U.S. three-star general would be in com-
mand only of U.S. forces in South Korea. This shift occurs because 
U.S. foreign policy becomes stridently isolationist with the reelection 
of President Trump. In this second scenario, Kim and DPRK leader-
ship perceive a weakened U.S.-ROK alliance, thus providing an oppor-
tunity to advance militarily.
The two scenarios posit that a DPRK perception, real or mis-
taken, of weakened U.S.-ROK deterrence will lead to erosion of con-
ventional deterrence. Each scenario ends with North Korea carrying 
out military action, but it does not consider the next steps that might 
occur. The purpose of ending the scenarios in this way is to generate 
discussion on what happens when a crisis occurs in which conventional 
military power is used, conventional deterrence erodes, and escalation 
to the use of nuclear weapons becomes a possibility. Finally, to inform 
the following two scenarios, it is useful to keep in mind how North 
Korea might perceive the following factors or conditions:
• DPRK perception of the military threats from South Korea or 
the United States or from other regional actors in terms of their 
capabilities and disposition of forces
• DPRK internal regime dynamics
• Third-party intervention by key regional actors, such as the 
United States, China, Japan, or Russia
• DPRK perception of an opportunity to use military force to fur-
ther its objectives
• DPRK understanding of chemical weapons as part of its conven-
tional deterrent
• the strength of the U.S.-ROK alliance. 
These factors can shape and affect how North Korea perceives 
(rightly or wrongly) a weakening in conventional military deterrence on 
the Korean Peninsula and, in turn, how it might act on those perceptions.
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Scenario 1: Moon Defense Reforms Erode Conventional 
Deterrence
By the start of 2022, the defense reforms put in place by former ROK 
President Moon in 2018 have had profound effects on the entire ROK 
military, especially the ROK Army. Although the ROK Air Force and 
Navy saw increased investments in modernization in high-tech weapon 
systems and associated sensors, the ROK Army has really felt the effect 
of the Moon reforms.3 The logic for the Moon reforms was that South 
Korea needed to boost the technological capabilities of its air force 
and navy because they could play a bigger role in safeguarding ROK 
interests from potential threats from regional actors other than North 
Korea. The assumption is that South Korea needs to curb Chinese and 
Japanese threats to its interests in the region.
One impact of the Moon military policy changes is the goal to 
reduce the overall manpower end strength of the ROK Army by about 
15 percent. The implication of this policy change is that the downsizing 
led to the ROK Army’s end strength in 2020 being a mere 300,000—a 
cut of almost 30  percent. This reduction in manpower has had an 
important effect in the overall number of combat infantry divisions in 
the ROK Army, going from 16 in 2018 to only nine in 2022. Along 
similar lines, the total number of ROK Army armored-mechanized 
divisions, which would provide the offensive punch for any ROK Army 
operations on the Korean Peninsula, dropped from six in 2018 to only 
two in 2022.4
The sharp reduction in ROK armored-mechanized divisions 
results partly from the reduction of the conscription period from 
3  Yeo Jun-suk, “Moon Administration Seeks to Cut Service Period to 18 Months,” Korea 
Herald, May 3, 2018. 
4  See Josh Smith, “Buying a Big Stick: South Korea’s Military Spending Has North Korea 
Worried,” Reuters, September 10, 2019; Sungyoung Jang, “How Will ‘Defense Reform 2.0’ 
Change South Korea’s Defense?” The Diplomat, August 27, 2018; Song Sang-ho, “Defense 
Reform Plan to Cut Generals, Create Ground Command, Retain 3-Axis System,” Yonhap 
News Agency, July 27, 2019; James M. Minich, The North Korean’s People’s Army: Origins and 
Current Tactics, Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2005; and Republic of Korea, 2016 
Defense White Paper, Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, May 2017.
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21.5 months to only 18. The time required to train an ROK recruit on 
basic light infantry skills and tactics takes much less time than it takes 
to train a recruit to become proficient on, for example, a main battle 
tank, such as the ROK K-1. It simply takes much longer to develop 
the skill set required for an armored crewman than it does to train 
a soldier to shoot a rifle and perform relatively simply light infantry 
tactics. Thus, by 2022, the ROK armored divisions cannot man all six 
divisions; instead, divisions are reduced to two and manned with ROK 
noncommissioned officers and soldiers who volunteered to do a three-
year enlisted stint.
During the years of the Moon reforms, the ROK administration 
justified the downsizing of the ROK Army by positing that the DPRK 
military no longer posed a direct security threat as it had in previous 
years, which meant that the ROK Army size and capabilities could be 
cut back. The administration also argued that even if North Korea did 
remain a threat, albeit a lessened one, the high-tech weaponry improve-
ments of the ROK Air Force and Navy could easily deal with any mili-
tary provocations put forward by North Korea.
Unfortunately for the Moon administration, its projection that 
diplomatic relations with North Korea would get better took a signifi-
cant turn for the worse. Kim had hoped that the fruits of his friend-
ship with President Trump would produce a loosening of economic 
sanctions against his country, but that did not pan out. As a result, 
Kim has begun intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) testing again 
in 2022, along with setting off a seventh nuclear test, this one with a 
high mega-tonnage outcome that put it well within the thermonuclear 
realm. These aggressive actions occur in tandem with the U.S. admin-
istration taking a much firmer, belligerent line with the DPRK regime. 
Thus, even though the ROK defense policy had reoriented toward a 
defanged ROK Army by 2022, a very different diplomatic tack has 
taken place.
In late 2022, amid these rising tensions, an unfortunate event 
began a provocation cycle that ultimately led to a conventional military 
confrontation on the Korean Peninsula. A Korean Air flight departed 
out of Busan bound for Beijing. In its commonly used flight path, it 
flew about five miles south of the demilitarized zone (DMZ), then 
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turned west toward its destination in China. However, a mistake in 
navigation took the aircraft to only one mile south of the DMZ. The 
pilots quickly assessed their error and reasoned that there was no foul 
because they had not crossed into North Korea. Unfortunately, the 
DPRK air defense did not see it that way, because U.S. B-52 bombers 
had been carrying out threatening training flights over the past year 
that put them on the exact same flight path as the Korean Air civilian 
airliner. The DPRK air defense radar mistakenly placed that airliner 
as crossing the DMZ; therefore, the airliner was shot down, killing 
everyone on board.5
The ROK response was quick and lethal. The new ROK president 
decided to send a strong message to Kim that this kind of behavior 
would have consequences. By order of the President, the ROK military 
launched 20 missiles into North Korea: half aimed at one of Kim’s per-
sonal residences on the outskirts of Pyongyang and the other half at a 
DPRK air defense command center on the eastern coast near Wonju. 
At the time of the strike, Kim was visiting a nuclear testing facility in 
the northern part of the country. When notified, he quickly moved to 
a command center near Pyongyang and conferred with his military 
leaders about what the response would be.
After a daylong discussion of his options, Kim decided to carry 
out a conventional military strike by DPRK ground forces into South 
Korea. Kim and his key military leaders perceived a vulnerability in 
the weakened state of ROK ground forces along the DMZ. Thus, over 
the next two days, DPRK conventional artillery fired a barrage from 
the western edge of the country along the DMZ east to the Chorwon 
Valley at ROK population centers south of the DMZ, with the inten-
tion of terrorizing ROK civilian population centers, causing panic and 
evacuations, and thus focusing ROK military response on silencing 
5  This Road to War modifies the scenario in a novel on a future nuclear war with North 
Korea: Jeffrey Lewis, The 2020 Commission Report on the North Korean Nuclear Attacks 
Against the United States: A Speculative Novel, New York: Mariner Books, 2018. Also see 
James Rosone and Miranda Watson, Battlefield Korea, Book Two of the Red Storm Rising 
Series, Grand Rapids, Mich.: Front Line Publishing, 2017; and Vann H. Van Diepen and 
Daniel R. Depetris, “Putting North Korea’s New Short-Range Missiles into Perspective,” 38 
North, September 5, 2019.
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DPRK conventional artillery. With the ROK Army’s focus on DPRK 
artillery and on assisting in the medical treatment and evacuation of 
ROK civilians, North Korea then launched a three-division assault 
across the DMZ and about 10 kilometers into South Korea. The goal 
of this assault was to seize three key population centers—Paju, Yeo-
cheon, and Chorwon—and, in effect, hold them hostage as a negotiat-
ing device to force the ROK government to cease its military strikes.
A twist that further complicated the situation for the ROK gov-
ernment and the United States was that the Chinese Army massed 
three People’s Liberation Army mechanized corps along the Yalu River, 
its border with North Korea. China’s political leaders warned the ROK 
and U.S. governments that any ground assault into North Korea would 
bring about a massive Chinese intervention into the conflict.
In this scenario, conventional military deterrence that the U.S.-
ROK alliance was supposed to provide eroded to the point at which 
that weakened deterrence convinced Kim that, in a provocation cycle 
between North Korea and ROK, he could launch powerful but still 
limited ground operations and seize a handful of ROK population cen-
ters close to the DMZ.
Scenario 2: Changes in U.S.-ROK Command Structures 
Erode
In this second scenario, the year is 2022 and the heady days of positive 
diplomatic relations between the U.S. administration and Kim ended 
with North Korea resuming nuclear weapon and missile tests. A provo-
cation cycle occurs that is shaped by a set of aggressive U.S. bomber 
“training” flights aimed at intimidating Kim and other DPRK senior 
officials. North Korea shoots down an ROK civilian airliner; South 
Korea responds with cruise missile strikes; and North Korea responds 
with conventional military action.
But Kim’s rationale for North Korea’s conventional military 
response in this provocation cycle is different from what it was in Sce-
nario 1. Here, North Korea perceives a weakening in ROK conven-
tional defense because of key decisions make between 2020 and 2021 
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that removed the U.S. four-star general in his or her dual role as com-
mander UNC and commander CFC. One of the key components of 
the UNC–CFC command structure since 1978 has been that, during 
peacetime, a senior ROK general has operational control over ROK 
military forces and the UNC commander controls the DMZ, as stipu-
lated in the 1953 Armistice Agreement. In wartime, however, opera-
tional control over all ROK military forces shifts to the U.S. four-star 
UNC–CFC commander. The purpose for that wartime control was 
to ensure a strong alliance between South Korea and the United States 
by having ultimate command in wartime go to the U.S. commander.6
By the mid-1990s, some ROK political and military leaders 
started to argue that the UNC–CFC command structure was a relic of 
the past, given the increased capabilities and size of the ROK military. 
In 2010, a tentative agreement was made between the ROK and U.S. 
governments to shift all operational-level command in wartime to the 
ROK military. In 2015, however, both governments decided to push 
that decision to a later date, largely because of the rise of Kim and his 
pursuit of nuclear weaponry.7
Because the relationship between North and South Korea vac-
illated between cooperative and antagonistic, the Moon administra-
tion in 2021 began to push hard for a shift in command structure to 
happen sooner rather than later. The core issue for President Moon and 
his subsequent successor was ROK sovereignty. If South Korea was a 
strong and independent nation-state with a highly sophisticated mili-
tary, then why did it need to subordinate its authority over its military 
forces in wartime to a U.S. commander?
At the same time, U.S. foreign policy became stridently isola-
tionist, reducing U.S. military presence around the world. In this sit-
uation, the Moon administration’s push for terminating the UNC–
CFC command structure hit a positive chord with the United States. 
6  For an excellent history of the UNC command during the Korea War, see Shawn P. 
Creamer, Answering the Korea Question: U.S. Government Policy Toward the Unified Com-
mand and the Korean Armistice Agreement, Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, Civilian 
Research Project, March 2017. 
7  Sub Kwak Kwang, The US-ROK Alliance, 1953–2001, Alliance Institutionalization, Ann 
Arbor, Mich.: Michigan University Press, 2006.
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Thus, the U.S. and ROK governments at the end of 2021 decided 
to remove the U.S. four-star command, turning it over to an ROK 
four-star commander. A three-star U.S. Army commander remained 
in South Korea but only had authority over U.S. forces (in peacetime 
and in wartime). Both sides argued that it made sense because of the 
lessening of the DPRK threat and South Korea’s new strategic focus 
on regional threats other than North Korea. Nonetheless, both sides 
also claimed that the alliance between two countries was as strong as 
ever and North Korea or any other regional actor should think twice 
about challenging that alliance.
This shift was something North Korea sought for decades because 
it guaranteed that any alliance training exercise would be decided on 
by the ROK government and not in conjunction with the United 
States. The other enticing element for North Korea about the shift 
was that it left a U.S. three-star commander in charge of the remain-
ing U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula without any command links 
to operational control of ROK forces. For North Koreans who watch 
the U.S.-ROK military alliance, this change might signal the first step 
in a general loosening of the alliance and a weakening of the military 
capabilities North Korea might face in a conflict. 
Once the provocation cycle began (the way it did in Scenario 1), 
Kim and North Korea again perceived a weakness in the conventional 
warfighting capabilities of the ROK military, this time because of the 
removal of the U.S. four-star UNC–CFC commander. As a result, 
Kim sensed an opportunity to use limited DPRK military strikes to 
force a complete withdrawal of all U.S. forces from South Korea. After 
discussing his options with his senior military leaders, Kim ordered the 
use of the regime’s array of improved short- to medium-range missiles 
and its improved multiple rocket launchers to strike the U.S. Army 
base at Pyeongtaek, the U.S. Navy Headquarters at Busan, and the 
ROK regional civilian airport at Gimpo.
Kim’s thinking in this scenario was that by striking these targets, 
he could coerce the ROK government onto a path toward unification 
without U.S. involvement.
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Conclusions
An important insight from these two scenarios is that conventional 
deterrence that has been effective since 1953 could quickly erode 
during a crisis, given other factors that influence the integrity of deter-
rence on the Korean Peninsula. Assessing some plausible scenarios in 
which conventional deterrence is stressed on the Peninsula shows how 
a stable alignment can be upset by conventional conflict in response 
to a crisis and quickly escalate to a nuclear crisis. Once fighting with 
conventional weapons begins, there might be few off-ramps for avoid-
ing a nuclear exchange. A recent study identified four significant chal-
lenges that complicate the Korean security situation.8 First, North 
Korea’s nuclear capability presents a fundamentally different security 
challenge. Second, North Korea has increased its artillery capability to 
hold key ROK urban areas at risk. Third, it is virtually impossible to 
evacuate Chinese, U.S., and other foreign citizens from South Korea 
in the face of impending conflict. And fourth, fears of DPRK regime 
collapse could occur with little warning with many potential conse-
quences, most of them bad. Thus, understanding how conventional 
deterrence works, and how it might fail, is important to understanding 
nuclear deterrence. 
The United States and South Korea can increase the “firebreaks” 
leading to a nuclear crisis by addressing some of the factors that might 
influence North Korean perceptions of conventional deterrence on the 
Korean Peninsula. For example, effectively managing the U.S.-ROK 
alliance is critical to show North Korea that there are not good options 
to use military force to achieve its objectives. As part of this manage-
ment, taking measures to strengthen the alliance’s conventional deter-
rence posture is important. Additionally, states in the region reassuring 
North Korea that third-party military intervention is unlikely (unless 
it takes aggressive military action toward South Korea or other states) 
might constructively influence its perception of threats to the regime.
8  Gian Gentile, Yvonne K. Crane, Dan Madden, Timothy M. Bonds, Bruce W. Ben-
nett, Michael J. Mazarr, and Andrew Scobell, Four Problems on the Korean Peninsula: North 
Korea’s Expanding Nuclear Capabilities Drive a Complex Set of Problems, Santa Monica, 




North Korea Nuclear Doctrine
There are some key questions about North Korea’s approach to nuclear 
weapons:
• How does North Korea think about its nuclear doctrine, desired 
force posture and related capabilities needs, the relationship 
between its nuclear and conventional forces, and the role of 
nuclear weapons in deterrence and escalation? 
• Under what conditions would North Korea be tempted to con-
sider nuclear use?
In this chapter, we evaluate such key questions by examining 
open-source data on possible DPRK nuclear doctrines and compar-
ing them with scenarios that might call for the use of nuclear weap-
ons. The result is necessarily somewhat speculative, both because our 
knowledge of North Korea’s nuclear doctrine is extremely limited and 
because the actual response of national leaders in any given contin-
gency cannot be predicted. Therefore, the analysis in this chapter is 
designed not to produce concrete findings or predictions but to provide 
a more-general guide that can help in assessing possible risks and pat-
terns of DPRK behavior.1
We start by examining the possible nuclear doctrines that states 
can choose from and where North Korea might fit, how we can infer 
DPRK intentions from its official statements, and potential DPRK 
nuclear doctrines and nuclear use scenarios.
1  Gentile et al., 2019. 
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Nuclear Doctrine: The Range of Possibilities
Any state has a range of nuclear doctrines to choose from, depending 
partly on technical capacities, threat perceptions, geopolitical con-
text, formal alliances, and other factors. A review of the literature on 
deterrence—and of the actual deterrence policies of the established 
nuclear powers—points to several possible approaches to deterrence, 
including the following:
• Virtual deterrence: Deterrence by ambiguity. States deter by inten-
tionally not disclosing, or at least not fully disclosing, their capa-
bilities and/or the conditions under which they would use nuclear 
weapons2 
• Minimum deterrence: Deterrence by acquiring the smallest pos-
sible number of nuclear weapons that could credibly be viewed 
as sufficient for deterrence. Because of their small number, min-
imum deterrents are typically postured for retaliation against 
countervalue targets.3 States with minimum deterrents do seek to 
make them survivable, but only to the degree required to promise 
a minimal, countervalue second strike.
• Assured deterrence: Deterrence by acquiring a substantial and 
secure second-strike capability, one that threatens any attacker 
with comprehensive retaliation and national destruction beyond 
the level of a minimum deterrent. Typically, countries that pursue 
such a policy deploy hundreds of survivable and diverse nuclear 
weapons across a nuclear dyad or triad.4 Countries with assured 
destruction policies can (and often do) still create a strong fire-
break between conventional and nuclear war, including such 
declaratory policies as a no-first-use pledge.
2  Zafar Khan, Pakistan’s Nuclear Policy: A Minimum Credible Deterrence, Abingdon, UK: 
Routledge, 2015, p. 3.
3  Khan, 2015, p. 7.
4  Vipin Narang, “Nuclear Strategies of Emerging Nuclear Powers: North Korea and Iran,” 
Washington Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 1, Spring 2015.
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• Asymmetric deterrence: The most risk-acceptant of deterrence 
approaches, typically chosen by states that have extraordinarily 
intense threat perceptions. A state deters by integrating nuclear 
weapons into its warfighting strategy and threatens to escalate 
very readily from a conventional conflict to a nuclear one. States 
pursuing such strategies typically deploy a variety of nuclear weap-
ons from low to high yield to create multiple escalatory options.
These approaches are not mutually exclusive. A state can pursue 
both minimum and asymmetric deterrence, for example, deploying a 
small arsenal with countervalue retaliatory policies but tightly integrated 
with conventional warfighting capabilities and designed to threaten rapid 
escalation. Nuclear powers have typically combined elements of multiple 
deterrence strategies: The United States employed aspects of assured and 
asymmetric deterrence; China, France, and the United Kingdom have 
largely employed minimum deterrence strategies but with the growing 
hallmarks of assured deterrence. Some analysts say that Pakistan has 
an asymmetric strategy and that Russia has integrated some aspects of 
asymmetric strategy into recent statements on nuclear use doctrines.
Available evidence seems to suggest that North Korea aspires 
to achieve capabilities consistent with both assured and asymmetric 
deterrence.5 The variety and character of nuclear systems that North 
Korea has pursued speak, at a minimum, to a perceived need for a level 
of assured deterrence through mobile land-based missiles and missile-
firing submarines. At the same time, it appears to be prepared to blur 
the line between conventional and nuclear use—as a product of its 
perception of conventional inferiority—in ways that speak to an asym-
metric deterrent strategy.
Some observers (including senior-level participants in recent 
RAND wargames on DPRK nuclear-use scenarios) sometimes contend 
that North Korea would not use nuclear weapons until the endgame 
of a conflict because it would realize that the response would be devas-
5  A good discussion of this is in Sung Chull Kim, “North Korea’s Nuclear Doctrine and 
Revisionist Strategy,” in Kim and Michael D. Cohen, eds., North Korea and Nuclear Weap-
ons: Entering the New Era of Deterrence, Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 
2017, pp. 35–36.
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tating. But there are countervailing pressures: North Korea’s strategic 
situation means that it would almost certainly feel pressure to strike 
first on the brink, or in the early stages of, a future war, partly out of a 
concern for its vulnerability and perhaps in the hope of forcing an early 
conflict termination. As Vipin Narang has argued:
Faced with the prospect of a U.S.-led invasion, Pyongyang’s con-
ventional inferiority requires it to degrade the United States’ abil-
ity to sustain the attack against it. This means it essentially has 
no option but to use nuclear weapons first against targets such 
as Andersen Air Force Base in Guam, which stations American 
bombers, and a variety of allied bases in Japan and South Korea.6
In practice, North Korea does have options short of nuclear use to 
disrupt U.S. force flow and military operations, but most observers agree 
that they would constitute holding actions at best. And North Korea’s 
perception of its susceptibility to a U.S. first strike could create significant 
crisis instability; as Narang, 2017, concludes, “States with small arsenals 
that are put under counterforce pressure have itchy trigger fingers.”
For these and other reasons, North Korea might look to Pakistan 
as a possible model for developing a nuclear force and accompanying use 
doctrine. Like North Korea, Pakistan faces a primary adversary with con-
ventional superiority. It also could face multiple adversaries at the time 
same (in Pakistan’s conception, India and, in some extreme scenarios, 
the United States). Its security relationship with China is close, but to a 
degree that it can count on Beijing for a reliable security guarantee. Addi-
tionally, Pakistan engages in asymmetric provocation attacks against its 
main rival, as does North Korea, and values the ultimate deterrent that 
nuclear weapons could provide as a cover for such activities.
In sum, then, the experience of other nuclear powers points to 
several overarching nuclear strategies and deployment approaches that 
North Korea might adopt. These still would not prescribe situations in 
which nuclear weapons would be used, but they would provide broad 
guidance about the role of those weapons in national strategy.
6  Vipin Narang, “Why Kim Jong Un Wouldn’t Be Irrational to Use a Nuclear Weapon 
First,” Washington Post, September 8, 2017.
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Inferring Intentions: DPRK Official Statements
The regime’s official statements provide a second source of information 
on North Korea’s evolving nuclear doctrine. DPRK official state media 
can often provide clues to the regime’s beliefs and strategies—or at least 
to what DPRK leaders want the world to think—because the messages 
are so tightly controlled.7 Pyongyang’s official statements have offered 
clues about its possible nuclear doctrine. Official statements, Alexan-
dre Mansourov has explained, have “alluded to the fact that the North 
Korean government has already developed a set of standard operating 
procedures for the authorization of the employment of nuclear weapons 
in wartime.”8 Those signals point to a concept for the role of nuclear 
weapons that is increasingly elaborate and risk-acceptant.
The spring of 2013 seems to have been an important moment in 
North Korea’s public references to the role of nuclear weapons. Kim 
declared the emergence of a “new strategic line” marrying nuclear 
capabilities with enhanced economic performance at home, the so-
called byungjin policy.9 North Korea published a law governing nuclear 
7  One challenge in inferring DPRK doctrine from government statements or leaders’ 
behavior is that states can have divergent views on nuclear doctrine and broadcast conflict-
ing or misleading signals. Writing on the DPRK case, Peter Hayes and Scott Bruce point 
out that there is frequently a divergence “between what a country’s leaders say and what its 
nuclear war planners and military units do,” and they argue that “nuclear weapons organiza-
tions are complex entities that often distort outcomes intended by high-level decisionmakers, 
or lead to perverse, unintended actions that are invisible to those at the top” (Peter Hayes 
and Scott Bruce, “Translating North Korea’s Nuclear Threats into Constrained Operational 
Reality,” in Gregory Moore, ed., North Korean Nuclear Operationality, Baltimore, Md.: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2014, pp. 17, 29). Declaratory policy is not always the best clue to 
a country’s real doctrine or ultimate behavior. This problem might be somewhat attenuated 
in a totalitarian system in which all officials will be looking closely to the ultimate leader’s 
statements for guidance. But caution should be taken in drawing simple lines between public 
statements and nuclear use practices.
8  Alexandre Mansourov, Kim Jong Un’s Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy: What Everyone 
Needs to Know, Berkeley, Calif.: Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, Nautilus 
Peace and Security Special Reports, December 16, 2014.
9  Hong Yung Lee, “North Korea in 2013: Economy, Executions, and Nuclear Brinkman-
ship,” Asian Survey, Vol. 54, No. 1, January/February 2014, p. 90. This byungjin policy of 
building nuclear weapons and at the same time advancing economic growth was approved in 
March 2013. At the same time, Kim Jong-Un himself gave a speech in which he referred to the 
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weapons at that time, which was accompanied by many public ref-
erences to threats of nuclear escalation. The Korean Central News 
Agency (KCNA), for example, broadcast images of Kim reviewing an 
“operational plan of the KPA [Korean Peoples’ Army] Strategic Rocket 
Force for firepower strike” in March 2013. It was during this period 
that North Korea claimed that it “exercise[d] the right to launch a 
preemptive nuclear attack in order to destroy the strongholds of the 
aggressors.” Official DPRK broadcasts have mentioned such targets as 
Guam, Japan, Hawaii, and a variety of U.S. cities stretching from Los 
Angeles to Washington, D.C.10
That 2013 law, the “Law on Consolidating the Position of Nuclear 
Weapons State,” appears to remain the single most significant and 
authoritative public DPRK pronouncement on its nuclear doctrine.11 
This generally commits the DPRK regime to developing a nuclear 
force capable of imposing immense destruction on states that under-
take aggression against it; insofar as the law is any guide, the objec-
tives are essentially defensive. The law itself makes no mention of a 
no-first-use doctrine, suggesting that North Korea views conventional 
and nuclear operations as part of an unbroken continuum (though 
such a no-first-use policy, or something like it, has come up in other 
DPRK official statements). The notion of an “unbroken continuum” 
is obfuscated by North Korea’s 2013 “Law on Consolidating Position 
of Nuclear Weapons State,” which states that nuclear weapons are for 
defensive purposes.12 
DPRK official statements have highlighted several specific com-
ponents of a possible nuclear doctrine to serve the objectives of the 
“pivotal role of nuclear weapons in war-deterrent strategy and war-waging strategy.” The offi-
cial DPRK national security strategy states that “the nuclear deterrent enables peaceful devel-
opment at home” and protects the state (“2013 Plenary Meeting of WPK Central Committee 
and 7th Session of Supreme People’s Assembly,” North Korean Economy Watch, April 1, 2013).
10  Cited in Hong Yung Lee, 2014, pp. 91–92.
11  Daniel Wertz, Matthew McGrath, and Scott LaFoy, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons 
Program,” National Committee on North Korea, April 2018. 
12  KCNA, “Law on Consolidating Position of Nuclear Weapons State Adopted,” April 1, 
2013b.
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state. North Korea’s most-essential state objectives begin with deter-
ring U.S. aggression, and its doctrine presumably has this as a fun-
damental and guiding goal. Many DPRK statements emphasize that 
its nuclear arsenal is a product of U.S. aggressive threats, especially 
nuclear threats. North Korea claims to be justified in its acquisition of 
nuclear capabilities because it is operating under coercion.
Increasingly, North Korea has made specific reference to nuclear 
strikes against the United States, including Washington, D.C., and the 
White House.13 Such claims suggest a DPRK ambition to target U.S. 
bases, and public statements have explicitly mentioned such sites as 
U.S. facilities in South Korea, Guam, Hawaii, and the western United 
States. DPRK statements imply that such strikes would be part of an 
offensive doctrine that aims at the capacity to strike a crippling blow 
against enemy conventional forces.
North Korea has publicly claimed that nuclear weapons will “beat 
back any aggressor troops at one strike.”14 Another statement referred 
to its intention to “desolate the bases of nuclear provocations with our 
method of merciless preemptive strikes.”15 Kim himself has referred to 
a plan to “blow up and reduce everything to ashes at a single nuclear 
strike.”16 Such claims of all-out retaliation might stem from a DPRK 
belief that it remains vulnerable to nuclear preemption and that piece-
meal employment of nuclear weapons might only invite a disarming 
U.S. attack.
13  KCNA, “Official Statement of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea,” 
August 12, 2015b. Also see KCNA, “Official Statement of the National Emergency Mea-
sures Committee on Opposition Against Nuclear War Exercises to Invade DPRK,” April 23, 
2015a; and KCNA, 2013b, which claims that nuclear weapons “serve the purpose of deter-
ring and repelling the aggression and attack of the enemy” by “dealing deadly retaliatory 
blows at the strongholds of aggression.” A more recent statement described a DPRK drill that 
simulated “preemptive strikes at ports and airfields in the operational theater in South Korea 
where the U.S. imperialists nuclear war hardware is to be hurled” (KCNA, “Kim Jong Un 
Guides Drill for Ballistic Rocket Fire,” July 20, 2016b).
14  KCNA, 2013b.
15  KCNA, 2015a. The same statement contains suggestive references to “a do-or-die battle 
to provide an epochal occasion” to end the U.S. aggressive threat, again implying a massive, 
single strike.
16  Quoted in Mansourov, 2014.
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Multiple DPRK official statements and descriptions of some DPRK 
exercises imply a willingness to preempt expected U.S. military action, 
whether conventional or nuclear. One 2016 operational scenario, for 
example, seems to describe a preemptive strike.17 And in response to U.S. 
military exercises in 2014, North Korea expanded the scope of nuclear 
threats to cover limited clashes. If the United States were to “perpetrate 
a military provocation for igniting a war” in various areas, including 
“the five islands in the West Sea of Korea” or in the DMZ, “it will not 
be limited to local war, but develop into an all-out war, a nuclear war.”18
DPRK statements have been inconsistent on whether North Korea 
would target South Korea with nuclear weapons, sometimes suggesting 
that North Korea would refrain from nuclear attacks on fellow Kore-
ans but at other times threatening nuclear decapitation attacks against 
the ROK government—specifically, strikes on the Blue House.19
DPRK public statements suggest that Pyongyang is seeking min-
iaturization to provide a more flexible range of nuclear employment.20 
Some DPRK public documents have gone so far as to specifically 
define the goal as nuclear warheads of less than 15 kilotons and have 
suggested that smaller warheads are more useful because of the level of 
development of the Korean Peninsula, which makes it difficult to use 
powerful weapons without causing massive collateral damage. Official 
statements have also indicated that smaller warheads can make better 
use of a limited stockpile of fissile material.
Official DPRK statements have referred explicitly to building 
“various types of nuclear weapons with the aim of successful attain-
17  Léonie Allard, Mathieu Duchâtel, and François Godement, Pre-Empting Defeat: In 
Search of North Korea’s Nuclear Doctrine, London: European Council on Foreign Relations, 
November 22, 2017, p. 3. 
18  KCNA, 2015a.
19  KCNA, “Crucial Statement of KPA Supreme Command,” February 23, 2016a; and 
Allard et al., 2017, p. 3.
20  North Korea’s public statement on the occasion of its third nuclear test, for example, 
claimed that it was “conducted with more miniaturized, lightweight, diversified nuclear 
weapons compared with the former models. . . . The weapons’ nuclear yield and other char-
acteristics correspond precisely to their design values” (KCNA, “KCNA Report on a Success-
ful 3rd Underground Nuclear Test,” February 12, 2013a).
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ment of a wide range of military objectives.” These public statements 
have explicitly distinguished among various categories of weapons, such 
as strategic, tactical, and battlefield nuclear capabilities. Strategic weap-
ons target cities and large military targets; tactical weapons target enemy 
forces in operational areas; battlefield weapons have a similar focus but 
a shorter range. More broadly, there is evidence in DPRK official state-
ments of a growing aggressiveness in elements of doctrine.21
Thus, if recent DPRK public statements are any indication, Pyong-
yang might have elaborate notions of the roles that its nuclear weapons 
might be able to perform. The statements point to a doctrine well beyond 
any form of minimum or existential deterrence, one that is designed to 
create the risk of large-scale and widespread nuclear retaliation, which 
theoretically could be used as a cover for aggressive actions.22 These state-
ments and DPRK nuclear development trajectories point to the desire 
to field an impressive variety of nuclear capabilities that could ensure 
various first-strike and retaliatory options. There is also a disturbing sug-
gestion that North Korea might be adopting a doctrine of an all-out, 
comprehensive preemptive blow to be launched when a U.S. attack that 
threatens regime survival is underway or even anticipated.
But even in DPRK public statements, there is evidence of per-
ceived constraints on the role and use of nuclear weapons.23 North 
Korea appears to be aware of several geopolitical problems with uncon-
strained nuclear capabilities and threats. It has sought to qualify its 
nuclear aspirations in notable ways, which could create some boundar-
ies to the sorts of doctrine it is willing to embrace. These statements 
have suggested limits to the appropriate uses of nuclear weapons: In 
2006, for example, North Korea appeared to enunciate a no-first-use 
policy in the wake of a nuclear test (though this has not been consis-
tently reaffirmed). There is also evidence that DPRK leaders since Kim 
21  See Andrew O’Neil, “North Korea’s Changing Nuclear Posture,” The Strategist, April 17, 
2013. See also KCNA, “Question and Answer with President of Nuclear Scientific Research 
Center,” September 15, 2015c.
22  Sung Chull Kim describes the gradually growing ambitions of the DPRK approach to 
nuclear weapons (Kim, 2019, pp. 37–38).
23  KCNA, 2013b.
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Il-Sung have hesitated to target South Korea, for fear of the effect on 
their intended identity as liberators of their fellow countrymen (as well 
as perhaps more-practical concerns, such as fallout risks). But North 
Korea does not make this promise for states that “join a hostile nuclear 
weapons state in its invasion and attack on the DPRK,” which presum-
ably would include South Korea.24
Pyongyang also appears to take seriously the significance of the 
decision for nuclear use and has hinted at command and control (C2) 
arrangements more rigid and centralized than would be expected for a 
fully articulated flexible response doctrine. The most significant public 
statement made so far on nuclear doctrine, for example—the reports 
surrounding 2013’s “Law on Consolidating the Position of Nuclear 
Weapons State”—specifically claimed that nuclear use could only be 
approved “by a final order of the Supreme Commander of the Peoples’ 
Army” and that the purpose of the use would be to “repel invasion 
or attack from a hostile nuclear weapons state and make retaliatory 
threats.” The same document promises to “establish a mechanism and 
order” for “safekeeping and management so that nukes and their tech-
nology, weapon-grade nuclear substance may not leak out illegally.”25
Along with such obscure declaratory statements, North Korea has 
solidified its command structures for nuclear deterrence. In 2012, as it 
revised its constitution to formally declare itself a nuclear state, Pyong-
yang established the Strategic Rocket Command as an independent 
entity. Later, it renamed this command the Strategic Rocket Force, 
then the Strategic Force.26 It can be assumed that this process has been 
accompanied by a growing formalization of doctrinal and C2 proce-
24  Mansourov, 2014. See also John M. Sanford and Andrew Scobell, North Korea’s Military 
Threat: Pyongyang’s Conventional Forces, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Ballistic Missiles, 
Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute Publications, April 3, 2020, p. 96; and Alexandre Y. 
Mansourov, “The Origins, Evolution, and Current Politics of the North Korean Nuclear Pro-
gram,” Nonproliferation Review, Spring-Summer 1995, p. 30; and KCNA, 2013b, which says 
that “The DPRK shall neither use nukes against the non-nuclear states nor threaten them with 
those weapons unless they join a hostile nuclear weapons state in its invasion and attack on the 
DPRK.” This would justify strikes on both South Korea and Japan.
25  KCNA, 2013b.
26  Wertz, McGrath, and LaFoy, 2018.
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dures, although evidence of these aspects of North Korea’s nuclear 
development is lacking.
North Korea’s recent behavior does not speak, at least so far, to 
a state determined to use a growing nuclear arsenal combined with 
a strategy of escalation dominance to engage in increasingly danger-
ous provocations. Since mid-2013, for example, apart from momentary 
crises over disputes at the DMZ, North Korea has reverted to a rela-
tively standard, and generally restrained, process of interaction with the 
United States and South Korea. So far, North Korea’s growing arsenal 
has not produced any straight-line outcomes of growing belligerence.27
Potential DPRK Nuclear Doctrines
We can infer a set of possible DPRK doctrines that might fit some com-
bination of evidence. These doctrines might ultimately reflect a middle 
ground between North Korea’s most-extreme aspirations and the reali-
ties of the geopolitical situation and the technical constraints inher-
ent in the production of nuclear weapons. Such analysis is necessarily 
speculative, given the limits of our understanding of DPRK thinking 
(and even actions).28 Various observers have examined the same broad 
set of evidence and come to very different conclusions. Until recently, 
27  This accords with some limited but suggestive empirical research indicating that nuclear 
weapons do not empower regional powers to acquire more in confrontational situations. 
See Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, “The Coercive Limits of Nuclear Weapons,” 
paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal, 
Canada, March 16–19, 2011.
28  Scobell and Sanford conclude that 
North Korea may or may not possess an explicit doctrine for its nuclear arsenal. Judging 
from the experience of other states that became nuclear powers, such as China and India, 
it is quite possible that North Korea has yet to devise one. Lack of attention to formulat-
ing a doctrine is plausible especially since the consuming preoccupation almost certainly 
has been simply to develop nuclear weapons and then build an arsenal. Moreover, even if 
it has done so, this probably has not been expressed in the form of a written document. 
(Scobell and Sanford, 2020, p. 87)
Their discussion of the ambiguity doctrine (pp. 88–93) presumes that at least some 
implicit understandings of the role of nuclear weapons are guiding DPRK nuclear develop-
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most experts said that the sum total of incentives for North Korea would 
encourage it to retain a relatively minimal nuclear posture.29 Peter Hayes 
and Scott Bruce, for example, said that North Korea would not be con-
fident of getting nuclear weapons to their targets and therefore would be 
unlikely to aim for a highly varied, flexible nuclear employment policy. 
They argue that “the sole use of nuclear weapons in North Korea would 
be defensive in the context of an all-out war.”30
Other assessments of DPRK nuclear aspirations found the basis for 
much more-ambitious nuclear doctrines. Joseph Bermudez argued that, 
at a minimum, North Korea seems to be moving to assured second-
strike capability.31 Kier Lieber and Daryl Press express concerns about 
a much more elaborate doctrine of “coercive nuclear escalation.”32 Vipin 
Narang has said that North Korea’s basic objective is a nuclear posture 
ments and use policy. But these could be very rough, not coherently articulated (or even 
written down), and might not govern actions in a crisis.
29  Terence Roehrig, for example, said that future DPRK doctrine is likely to remain in the 
realm of minimum deterrence, with a few dozen weapons kept in a largely countervalue pos-
ture (Terence Roehrig, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Future Strategy and Doctrine, Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Kennedy School, Belfer Center Policy Brief, May 2013). 
Hayes and Bruce argued that North Korea was likely to adopt a variant of a minimal strategy 
built largely around using nuclear weapons emplaced in tunnels and other primitive means 
of disrupting a U.S. or ROK attack (Hayes and Bruce, 2014, pp. 25–26).
30  Hayes and Bruce, 2014, pp. 27, 29. Andrei Lankov similarly argued that a minimal force 
is “more than enough for the dual purposes of deterrence and blackmail.” A nuclear force ten 
times as large, he contends, would not increase deterrence or blackmail abilities by a com-
mensurate amount (Andrei Lankov, “North Korea’s Nuclear Blackmail,” New York Times, 
opinion piece, November 25, 2010). Victor Cha similarly argued that a form of “existential” 
deterrence, not even extending to an assured second-strike capability, would be sufficient for 
most of the basic regime-preservation goals (Victor Cha, “North Korea’s Weapons of Mass 
Destruction,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 117, No. 2, Summer 2002, pp. 214–219).
31  Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., North Korea’s Development of a Nuclear Weapons Strategy, Wash-
ington, D.C.: U.S.-Korea Institute at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International 
Studies, pp. 13–14. Several DPRK doctrinal options are discussed in Bruce Bechtol, “Plan-
ning for the Unthinkable: Countering a North Korean Nuclear Attack and Management of 
Post-Attack Scenarios,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 23, No. 1, March 2011.
32  Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, Coercive Nuclear Campaigns in the 21st Century: 
Understanding Adversary Incentives and Options for Nuclear Escalation, Monterey, Calif.: U.S. 
Naval Postgraduate School, Report 2013-001, March 2013, p. 2.
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that “envisions catalyzing third-party military or diplomatic assistance 
when a state’s vital interests are threatened.”33
For our analysis, we reviewed evidence from DPRK objectives, 
capabilities, public statements, and the variety of options available to 
Pyongyang to offer an estimate of the likeliest set of emerging doc-
trines. These are summarized in Table 4.1.
We distinguished directed, operational forms of nuclear use from 
the much broader and more-diffuse political roles of nuclear weapons. 
North Korea has already made clear that its “doctrine” encompasses a 
broad variety of purposes for nuclear weapons, some operational and 
some more broadly political and even economic.34 In North Korea’s 
case, these broader roles feature enhancing regime legitimacy by sym-
bolizing state power and strength, contributing to economic revitaliza-
tion by offering deterrent power on the cheap and generating resources 
through blackmail and technology cooperation or sales, and generating 
competitive advantages in inter-Korean competition. Nuclear weapons 
also presumably play a significant domestic political role in solidifying 
Kim Jong-Un’s power.
There is significant overlap among several of the doctrines out-
lined in Table 4.1. For example, the minimum deterrence and catalytic 
33  Related to virtual deterrence, a catalytic strategy does not require a large or operation-
ally sophisticated nuclear force, merely one sufficient to create perceived risks of instability 
that the sponsor power would feel the need to deal with. The critical variable in the Korean 
case, Narang argues, is China: If North Korea believes China’s support to be largely guaran-
teed, then its nuclear arsenal “can remain limited and recessed.” Fears about China’s reliabil-
ity would prompt “an alternative nuclear strategy: an aggressive first-use posture—including 
developing short-range and tactical nuclear weapons” to guarantee deterrence (Narang, 2015, 
pp. 74–75).
34  One source has concluded that “Traditional U.S. deterrence concepts and postures . . . are 
not well suited to addressing attempts at low-level coercion by secondary nuclear powers with 
limited conventional capabilities” (Jerry Meyerle, Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Escalation in 
Regional Conflicts: Lessons from North Korea and Pakistan, Arlington, Va.: CNA, November 
2014, p. 2). Lieber and Press argue that countries most concerned about losing a conventional 
conflict to a militarily superior foe—and particularly those regimes that expect their top offi-
cials to be prosecuted in the wake of defeat, and ones that worry intensely about domestic upris-
ings if a war begins to go badly—are the likeliest to adopt coercive doctrines. Their analysis 
points to North Korea as the single likeliest nuclear state to adopt such doctrines (Lieber and 
Press, 2013, pp. 26–31, 33–34, 39).













Potential DPRK Nuclear Doctrines
Doctrine Minimum Deterrence Catalytic Massive Preemption Assured Retaliation Asymmetric Escalation
Basic concept Create existential 
risk of nuclear 
escalation to ensure 
regime survival
Use potential for 
nuclear development 
to lock in support 
from third-party 
sponsor
Facing attack, launch 
whole force in one 
preemptive blow to 
cripple U.S. power
Threaten survivable 




options with various 
delivery systems; 
aim for escalation 
dominance








Extensive: U.S. and 
allied military bases 
throughout Asia 
and, if reachable, 
continental United 
States












ful of weapons, 
no elaborate 
delivery systems
• Testing of 
weapons proves 
potential





but with more 
signals of addi-
tional develop-
ment to spark 
sponsor reaction
• Basic C2 systems
• Moderate: 




systems of crude 
accuracy
• Proven capabili-
ties in weapons 
and missiles
• Basic C2 systems
• Moderate: 
Dozens of weap-
ons deployed on 
survivable plat-
forms; mobile or 
concealed ICBMs 
and SLBMs




sibly close to 
100 weapons 
of various types 
mounted on 












Regime collapse or 
conventional attack
U.S. attack in 
course of conflict 
or expectation of 
imminent U.S. attack
Limited or large-
scale nuclear strikes; 
on verge of regime 
collapse
Multiple, in response 
to many potential 
escalation scenarios, 
some sparked by 
North Korea
NOTE: SLBM = submarine-launched ballistic missile.
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strategies have much in common. Also, the organization of the doc-
trines does not imply a simple spectrum; elements of flexible response 
could be added to an otherwise minimum posture, and achieving 
assured retaliation is in some ways just as demanding (and provocative) 
as a flexible response posture. In the end, we would expect DPRK doc-
trine to reflect a combination of some elements from several of these 
ideal types.
To assess the possible utility of different nuclear doctrines to 
North Korea, we posited three specific regime objectives for its nuclear 
force (not necessarily in priority order):
1. bolstering regime strength through prestige, legitimacy, coer-
cive power, and nationalist credibility
2. deterring U.S. coercion or attack 
3. in extreme circumstances, supporting offensive operations 
through escalation dominance, empowering provocation or 
offensive warfare.
We then assessed the degree to which each nuclear doctrine would 
meet these three goals. Table 4.2 illustrates our analysis. Green is favor-
able to North Korea, indicating that the doctrine would serve a given 
objective; red suggests that the doctrine would not meet that objective. 
The evaluations shown in Table 4.2 suggest several possible conclu-
sions. One is that if North Korea’s state objectives are predominantly 
defensive, the constraints and risks that apply to more-ambitious doc-
trines would seem prohibitive. Most doctrines achieve the basic regime 
goal of deterrence, although, over time, DPRK leaders might come 
to question whether a vulnerable deterrent force can credibly produce 
such a result. The doctrines that seem to achieve most objectives with 
relatively modest constraints are massive preemption and assured retal-
iation. Moreover, because these are not mutually exclusive, Pyongyang 
could combine them into a single doctrine, aiming for a survivable 
retaliatory force under tight centralized control to enhance deterrence 
and gain the prestige value of an advancing capability but not trust-
ing in the ability to ride out a first strike and thus planning for a spas-






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Requirements of DPRK Nuclear Doctrines
Potential 
Doctrine Critical Capabilities Required
Objectives 
Serveda
Constraints, Risks, and Costs1 2 3
Minimum 
deterrence
• Small number of operational 
warheads
• Primitive but effective delivery means
• Reliable but not necessarily surviv-
able C2
• Already achieved
• Might be an internal constraint on limitations; 
bureaucratic pressures to expand force
• Perception that doctrine is too weak to deter 
United States; need more-flexible, survivable 
forces
Catalytic • Small number of operational 
warheads
• Primitive but effective delivery means
• Potential for significant escalation of 
program
• Capabilities already achieved
• Chinese commitment might be a constraint
• Domestic constraint; lack of faith in outside 
powers
• More-limited prestige value
Massive 
preemption
• Intermediate-range missiles or  
equivalent delivery systems  
(e.g., submarines, aircraft)
• Reliable warheads of significant yield
• Regional strike requires reliable IRBMs, warheads, 
and REEVs, none of which might be technically 
feasible
• More-extreme options spark regional reaction
Assured 
retaliation
• Survivable retaliatory systems (SLBMs, 
mobile ICBMs, HDBTs)
• Delivery systems capable of reliably 
reaching U.S. or allied targets
• Reliable warheads, REEVs
• Survivable C2
• Requires all capabilities of preemption and  
survivable systems and C2
• North might never have full faith in survivability 
of system
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Table 4.2—Continued
Potential 
Doctrine Critical Capabilities Required
Objectives 
Serveda
Constraints, Risks, and Costs1 2 3
Asymmetric 
Escalation
• Survivable retaliatory systems  
(i.e., SLBMs, mobile ICBMs, HDBTs)
• Delivery systems capable of reliably 
reaching U.S. or allied targets
• Reliable warheads, REEVs
• Survivable and flexible C2
• Variety of flexible nuclear options, 
tactical and strategic
• Requires all capabilities of preemption and  
survivable systems and C2
• North might never have full faith in survivability 
of system
• Demands distributed C2, which runs against 
grain of regime
• Opens regime to massive strike once first nuclear 
attack is conducted
NOTES: Along the stoplight spectrum, dark green is favorable to North Korea, indicating that the doctrine would serve a given 
objective; red suggests that the doctrine would not meet that objective. HDBT = hard and deeply buried targets; IRBM = intermediate-
range ballistic missile; REEV = reentry vehicle.
a The three objectives are  
1. bolstering regime strength through prestige, legitimacy, coercive power, and nationalist credibility 
2. deterring U.S. coercion or attack  
3. in extreme circumstances, supporting offensive operations through escalation dominance, empowering provocation or offensive 
warfare.
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In terms of the C2 of nuclear forces, every open-source indica-
tion suggests that North Korea’s nuclear capabilities have been tightly 
controlled by a small group at the top of the state hierarchy, dominated 
by the supreme leader—whether Kim Il-Sung or Kim Jong-Il.35 The 
nuclear programs became personally associated with the Kim family, 
and there is evidence that the Kims were reluctant to delegate any key 
decisions on the program to the bureaucracy. There is no reliable open-
source information on Kim Jong-Un’s degree of delegation of nuclear 
matters. But to the extent that this delegation remains highly central-
ized, it points to doctrines that do not require extensive and flexible 
decisionmaking procedures throughout the chain of command. On 
the other hand, fear of vulnerability could lead to dispersal strategies 
with predelegated launch authority.36
Possible Nuclear Use Scenarios
Using the various sources of evidence we reviewed, we can infer a set 
of nuclear use scenarios involving North Korea that would reflect the 
operationalization of these doctrines. The leading objectives of such 
nuclear use would almost always revolve around a single goal: preserv-
ing the regime against actual or feared U.S. (and possibly ROK) mili-
tary aggression. But that goal can be interpreted in different ways, and 
North Korea can perceive an imminent threat of U.S. attack where 
none exists.37 Even a largely defensive motivation can produce mul-
tiple scenarios for possible nuclear escalation. (We also discuss possible 
offensive motives for nuclear threat or use, although these remain far 
less plausible— at least for now.)
This analysis also makes clear how much remains intentionally 
ambiguous—or perhaps actually undecided—in DPRK nuclear doc-
35  Mansourov, 1995, p. 29.
36  Meyerle, 2014, p. 16. See also Peter Hayes and Roger Cavazos, “North Korea in 2014: A 
Fresh Leap Forward Into Thin Air?” Asian Survey, Vol. 55, No. 1, January/February 2015, 
p. 124.
37  See Lewis, 2018.
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trine. Many policy choices have simply not been clearly articulated.38 
Despite these significant uncertainties, the combination of factors that 
we have discussed indicate that the likeliest resting point for the com-
bination of aspirations and constraints regarding the DPRK nuclear 
arsenal could be a form of general deterrence doctrine combining sec-
ond-strike potential, somewhat more-varied nuclear capabilities, and 
an intent to launch an overwhelming strike at the outset of war.
In this context, two scenarios reflect the likeliest situations for the 
use of nuclear weapons:
• employment of a single warhead, or a small number of them, to 
achieve very narrow tactical military objectives or larger politi-
cal signaling goals in the early phases of a conflict, which could 
include demonstration tests of nuclear weapons associated with 
delivery vehicles.
• all-out DPRK preemptive nuclear use to forestall imminent defeat 
or large-scale attack at the hands of U.S. forces.
First Scenario
The first scenario involves a situation in which a conventional campaign 
on the Korean Peninsula seems about to begin or is underway. North 
Korea, in this scenario, has not yet made the judgment that the war is 
escalating to regime-threatening levels. Nonetheless, such an approach 
might be adopted if Pyongyang begins to sense that the battle is turn-
38  As one report concludes, 
Strikingly, the sources do not identify a political endgame to the use of nuclear weapons. 
They bluff by referring to the destruction of the US, but never discuss the reunification 
by force of the Korean Peninsula. Missing from the open source material is any evalu-
ation of the consequences of striking the US or its allies with nuclear weapons, or of 
a clear threshold between a nuclear strike against a military base and a nuclear strike 
against a city. In sum, North Korea has no clearly defined concept of tactical use of 
nuclear weapons. . . . In addition, Pyongyang refuses to make a clear choice in its offi-
cial communications between retaliatory nuclear strikes and deterrence by denial, or to 
define a sequence of escalation from strikes against military facilities to destruction of 
cities. In theory, any attack against the country could therefore result in nuclear strikes 
against military or civilian targets. This looks like an attempt to strengthen deterrence 
by leaving all options on the table. (Allard, Duchâtel, and Godement, 2017, p. 6)
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ing against its forces and that the conventional fight could begin to cas-
cade downhill. It therefore chooses to employ a single nuclear weapon, 
or just a few, to achieve both local military effects—destroying ROK or 
U.S. mechanized units, for example, or creating a fallout zone that delays 
U.S.-ROK operations—and broader signaling goals. Such a limited esca-
lation would be designed to shock the United States into halting offen-
sive operations out of a concern for wider nuclear use by North Korea.
In RAND wargames involving this scenario, North Korea’s 
nuclear use has always unfolded on its own territory. If its goal is a lim-
ited escalation, the judgment of RAND players has been that North 
Korea would realize that to launch significant nuclear strikes on ROK, 
Japanese, or U.S. territory with massive loss of life would almost guar-
antee significant retaliation. (This differs from the second scenario, in 
which North Korea has made the decision to launch a more significant, 
war-stopping nuclear attack.) This scenario tends to emerge when U.S. 
or ROK forces have advanced into North Korea and nuclear weapons 
can be used against them on North Korea’s own soil.39 Given this sce-
nario, North Korea has many employment choices, even preset nuclear 
“land mines” waiting in expected corridors of advance.
Second Scenario
The second scenario would stem from a DPRK conclusion that the 
United States was on the verge of an all-out attack on North Korea, 
either in the form of comprehensive conventional or nuclear strikes or 
a ground invasion. Such a judgment could emerge during a conflict or 
even in peacetime (in an analogy to the Soviet paranoia, expressed in 
Operation Ryan, which produced a conviction that the United States 
was preparing an out-of-the-blue nuclear strike).40 North Korea’s goal 
would be to destroy the U.S. potential for power projection against 
it; the strike would likely feature dozens of nuclear attacks on U.S. 
39  In a real circumstance, of course, we cannot know whether North Korea would feel such 
a constraint. As previously noted, North Korea’s statements about its willingness to employ 
nuclear weapons against South Korea have been inconsistent.
40  For example, see Nate Jones, “The Soviet Side of the 1983 War Scare,” National Security 
Archive, November 5, 2018. 
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bases and ports in South Korea, Japan, Guam, and elsewhere.41 These 
could be combined with cyber strikes, chemical and biological weap-
ons employment, special operations forces sabotage, and conventional 
artillery attacks. North Korea’s evolving missile force offers it a broad 
range of potential strike packages, ranging from shorter-range missiles 
hitting U.S. bases in South Korea to intermediate-range missiles reach-
ing farther out into the Pacific.42
Even such a significant attack concept would likely attempt to 
preserve a residual strategic deterrent (unless U.S. forces were approach-
ing Pyongyang). North Korea’s goal might be to have mobile ICBMs 
and submarine-launched weapons capable of reaching the continental 
United States as a final deterrent to the United States taking regime-
destroying actions.43
It is not clear what assumptions North Korea would have to make 
to assume that strikes of this magnitude could be undertaken with-
out a massive U.S. nuclear counterstrike. DPRK leaders could come 
to believe that their nuclear threats against the continental United 
States would deter such a response. They could restrict attacks to U.S. 
military facilities and hope that this would produce some degree of 
restraint. The primary motivation, though, might be pure desperation. 
If North Korea believes that a U.S. campaign to destroy its regime 
has begun (or is on the verge of beginning), then North Korea might 
41  One analysis reviewed DPRK sources for specific potential targets and developed a list 
that featured Seoul, key bases and port facilities in South Korea (such as Osan, Pyeongtaek, 
Busan, Gunsan, and Daegu) and locations in Japan, such as Tokyo, Misawa, Yokohama, 
Yokosuka, Nagoya, Kyoto, and Osaka). See Allard, Duchâtel, and Godement, 2017, pp. 4–5.
42  Such a strike option could also feature decapitation strikes against ROK political leader-
ship, but such a choice would be highly escalatory and would be more in keeping with a final, 
all-out act of desperation.
43  Some DPRK statements have explicitly referred to a two-phase deterrent doctrine. A 
description of a conflict scenario released by the Korean People’s Army in 2016, for example, 
refers to an initial strike as a “crucial warning” which would be followed by a “second operation 
to totally eliminate [the enemy] at its source” (Allard, Duchâtel, and Godement, 2017, p. 3).
86    North Korean Decisionmaking
decide that it has one chance to strike a paralyzing blow, and that the 
risks involved must be accepted.44
As North Korea acquires more capabilities, its doctrine is likely to 
grow more ambitious for both strategic and bureaucratic reasons. We 
therefore highlight a third potential for nuclear use which, although 
not inherent in the default outcome we anticipate, nonetheless must be 
taken seriously by the United States and its allies. That is the DPRK 
use of a nuclear umbrella to conduct a regular, volatile series of provo-
cations and small-scale aggressions, perhaps leading gradually to more-
elaborate forms of aggression. This scenario envisions regular use of 
nuclear coercion, including threats of discrete types of nuclear use for 
leverage purposes (such as demonstration strikes or electromagnetic 
pulse bursts), in support of gradually more-aggressive DPRK provoca-
tions. Even if this did not become established doctrine, it is a pattern of 
behavior that could emerge in a specific crisis period.45
This more offensive concept of nuclear use could eventually reach 
the ultimate form of coercion: the threat to South Korea to accede 
to unification under DPRK terms or face annihilation. One DPRK 
defector, for example, has argued that Kim Jong-Un 
has a kind of illusion that, if he acquires these nuclear weapons 
and ICBMs, he could be able to compel Washington to pull U.S. 
troops out of South Korea, and once U.S. troops leave South 
44  It should be stressed that a U.S. preemptive strike to take out even part of North Korea’s 
nuclear capacity could lead North Korea to escalate to nuclear use. It could be very difficult, 
especially given the limits of DPRK political intelligence and operational intelligence, sur-
veillance, and reconnaissance, to distinguish a modest attack from something more elabo-
rate. If a handful of cruise missiles arrived without warning in the absence of any other U.S. 
military action, the attack might be effectively over before DPRK leadership had time to 
worry that a more comprehensive U.S. strike was underway. Thus, any significant attack on 
DPRK facilities, especially C2 sites, risks triggering one of the very few conditions for DPRK 
nuclear use.
45  Patrick McEachern has argued that North Korea’s nuclear capabilities aim to enhance 
its overall influence and coercive capabilities (Patrick McEachern, “More Than Regime Sur-
vival,” North Korean Review, Vol. 14, No. 1 Spring 2018).
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Korea, then foreign investments would follow U.S. troops out . . . 
and . . . then the South Korean business also would leave.46
Such claims typically do not reflect direct knowledge of Kim’s 
beliefs, however, and must be treated with at least a modicum of skep-
ticism, partly because such rumors could be deliberately designed to 
enhance North Korea’s ability to engage in coercive diplomacy. Given 
the broad consensus that North Korea’s primary goal is regime sur-
vival, there will always be a significant tension between that baseline 
requirement and any strategy to compel ROK surrender that involves 
threatening offensive nuclear war against South Korea, which is one of 
the world’s dozen largest economies and a full member of the global 
democratic community. If any U.S.-ROK alliance remains in place at 
the time, North Korea would be courting U.S. nuclear annihilation—
before it even had a chance to launch its threatened attack. Given 
potential fallout (nuclear and geopolitical), China would presumably 
be strongly opposed to such an act, or even the threat of such an attack. 
Japan, Russia, and others would also stand to be affected; the world 
community would face a clear example of unprovoked military aggres-
sion. Even if its threat worked, North Korea would have to engage 
in significant amounts of self-delusion to think that it could gain an 
ROK surrender and join the world community as an accepted, unified 
Korea. Such wishful thinking is not out of the question, but we have 
some evidence to believe that Kim and senior DPRK leaders are not 
completely out of touch with global realities.
In sum, then, evolving DPRK nuclear doctrine and capabilities 
point to an escalating series of potential cases in which North Korea 
would cross the threshold to the use of nuclear weapons, outlined in 
Table 4.3.
An important lesson of this roster of nuclear use scenarios is 
that the United States and South Korea have a significant ability to 
control the circumstances that would lead North Korea to undertake 
nuclear use. The fourth scenario can be forestalled with continuing 
46  “North Korean Defector Says Even a Limited Attack by U.S. Would Trigger All-Out 
War,” PBS NewsHour, November 3, 2017. 
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alliance commitments and coordination with other key actors, includ-
ing China. The other three would all stem from a DPRK perception 
of threat to its regime, and in some cases require the initiation of con-
flict itself. Through a combination of restraint, political agreements 
to reduce mutual threat perceptions and the perceived risk of war, and 
continued credible deterrent threats, the United States should be able 
to have significant confidence in its ability to mitigate the scenarios for 
DPRK nuclear use.
Table 4.3
Scenarios for DPRK Nuclear Use
Scenario Forcing Conditions Form of Nuclear Use





underway; U.S.-ROK forces 
operating inside North Korea 
or on verge of doing so; no 
fatal threat to regime yet
Single nuclear warhead 
or small number of them, 
likely employed against lead 




U.S. force flow 
and military 
targets
Conflict might be underway 
or not yet begun; North Korea 
perceives that United States 
is beginning process of large-
scale attack to end regime
Dozens of nuclear weapons 
(the entire DPRK force minus 
perhaps a handful of strategic-
deterrent warheads) delivered 
against U.S. military facilities 
and forces; possibly other 






In the endgame, North Korea 
employs whatever weapons 
that can reach the territorial 
United States to punish or 
paralyze U.S. military action
Small number of ICBM or SLBM 









U.S.-ROK alliance has fractured, 
China unwilling to prevent 
outcome, North Korea sees 
chance to realize its ultimate 
goal
Unclear; if coercive threat 
was rejected, could involve a 





The three discussion papers in this report aim to stimulate policy dis-
cussion, research, and information collection on how the DPRK leader-
ship, Kim Jong-Un in particular, makes decisions about North Korea’s 
future. Because there are many gaps in our understanding about Kim’s 
and the leadership’s decisionmaking process, the best we can do is out-
line plausible options that they might consider. Outlining logical path-
ways, branch points, and options that Kim and his leadership appear 
likely to consider provides a contextual framework for identifying deci-
sions that lead to courses of action. Being transparent about what we 
do not know is as important as indicating what we think we know 
based on the information available. Outlining what is not known with 
great confidence but seems important provides another field for fur-
ther data collection and analysis. How Kim, his military leaders, and 
the DPRK elite cadre sort through options regarding their economy, 
the military balance on the Korean Peninsula, and the use of nuclear 
weapons to ensure regime survival will have implications for the Asia-
Pacific region broadly defined.
Kim has indicated that “nothing has changed between the day 
when we maintained the line of simultaneously pushing forward the 
economic construction and the building of nuclear force.”1 If the eco-
nomic improvement embarked on without significant sanctions relief 
is confined to showcase tourist resort projects, the case studies in this 
1  “Report of the Fifth Plenary Meeting of 7th Central Committee of the WPK (Kim Jong 
Un’s 2020 New Year Address),” as published and translated into English by the Korean Cen-
tral News Agency, National Committee of North Korea, January 1, 2020.
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report indicate that it is unlikely that North Korea will meaningfully 
open markets and engage the global economy, as China and Vietnam 
did in the previous four decades. Tourism is an area less affected 
by international sanctions. Building showcase tourist resorts in SEZs 
away from the general population can be structured such that an elite 
cadre receives the greatest benefits. However, evidence of economic 
projects other than tourist resorts in SEZs might signal a desire to 
embrace open market opportunities and engage in commerce with 
foreign entities. 
Military stability on the Korean Peninsula is in the interest of 
North and South Korea, the United States, and other powers in the 
Asia-Pacific region. As the two scenarios in the second paper in this 
report illustrate, if conventional deterrence breaks down, there are few 
ways to prevent escalation to greater levels of high-intensity violence. 
As a result, all parties should be careful to not test the integrity of con-
ventional military deterrence. 
A catalytic triggering event seems necessary to erode the integrity 
of conventional deterrence on the Korean Peninsula. As illustrated in 
the scenarios considered in this report, unexpected events stemming 
from such mistakes as the downing of a passenger airliner or a misin-
terpreted move to overthrow the regime in North Korea could easily 
lead to strategic tragedy. Changes in ROK defense policy and the U.S.-
ROK relationship are important contextual factors that might influ-
ence the military balance on the Peninsula. South Korean President 
Moon’s administration policy changes for ROK military posture that 
focus on other regional threats could change DPRK perceptions of the 
strength of the ROK military. Over a longer period, declining ROK 
birth rates could lead to a smaller available population to fill the mili-
tary ranks. Monitoring Kim and the DPRK leadership’s reactions to 
these issues might provide insight into their perception of the stabil-
ity of the conventional military balance on the Peninsula. If Kim and 
DPRK leaders do not perceive these issues as eroding ROK and U.S. 
conventional military capabilities, then—barring a catastrophic event 
that threatens North Korea in some fashion—deterrence on the Pen-
insula probably would remain stable. In themselves, these contextual 
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factors do not seem sufficient at this point to embolden North Korea 
to take unprovoked and risky offensive military moves. 
But an unexpected event that North Korea perceives as threat-
ening combined with a series of changes that shift ROK military 
agility could undermine strategic stability on the Korean Peninsula. 
Developments that make strategic stability brittle raise the possibility 
of North Korea wielding nuclear weapons in ways to ensure regime 
survival. Because a security or nonintervention guarantee from the 
United States is neither likely nor credible to the North Koreans, the 
Kim regime will likely continue to slowly modernize the country’s 
capability over time. It is safe to infer that North Korea’s nuclear 
arsenal size and targeting doctrine is designed to provide enough of a 
deterrent posture to guarantee regime survival.
In many ways, North Korea has become an unrecognized nuclear 
power like Pakistan and India. Nuclear weapons provide for regime 
survival, and that is Kim’s desired purpose. North Korea’s 2013 law on 
nuclear weapons is the most concrete indication of the regime’s think-
ing about the use of nuclear weapons. Of note is how this law casts 
nuclear weapons as defensive in nature. The U.S. military footprint in 
the region is large and recognizable, and any significant U.S. military 
moves to ready follow-on forces in Japan or evacuate civilian depen-
dents will likely spook the DPRK regime. Any movements that appear 
to be a prelude to war might trigger rash action on the part of North 
Korea. Given the scarcity of information, it is very difficult to render a 
firm judgment about how Kim and other DPRK leaders consider their 
options for using nuclear weapons. 
The United States is fortunate to control some of the variables 
that might influence North Korea’s nuclear-use calculations. As noted 
at the end of Chapter Four, a combination of measures will reduce the 
risk and the United States can exercise them alone, with South Korea, 
with nations involved in the six party talks, and/or with the United 
Nations Security Council. Political negotiations that lead to agreements 
can reduce mutual threat perceptions and increase an understanding of 
the risk of war. As all sides seek political agreements, maintaining cred-
ible conventional and nuclear deterrents will be important. Monitor-
ing North Korea’s interests in political agreements and its appreciation 
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of deterrence can inform policymakers about which political engage-
ments are important. This combination of measures can mitigate the 
prospect of DPRK nuclear use. Stability over time affords opportuni-
ties for all parties to change in ways that make conflict less likely.
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